

HUDSON: KAZAK SOCIAL STRUCTURE

63

LARGER POLITICAL UNITS

Local groups were to a great extent independent, or at least autonomous, politically. They were nominally subject to the khans or sultans who at different times succeeded in gaining a measure of supremacy in different parts of the steppe. The khanates, however, were not, except for brief periods under an exceptional ruler, strong centralized states. Rather they were a combination of tribal confederacy and feudal union, the constituent parts of which were continually tending to break off and form new groupings. Levshin writes:¹²

... [leurs] chefs ... ne commandent pas, sans bien des exceptions, à des races, à des tribus entières, ni même à des sections de tribus, mais à des bandes, à des partis souvent composés de gens appartenant à des sections de tribus, de races ou même de hordes différentes.

Levshin uses "tribu" and "race" in the sense of the larger genealogical *uru strata*. His statement further indicates the lack of correlation between genealogical and political groupings.

It is clear from the above that the *ordas* themselves were not political units, at least at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Meyendorff¹³ says of the Great Orda that it had no one ruler but was broken up into a number of independent sections each with its own khan.¹⁴

Such khans held their position partly by virtue of descent from the heirs of the empire of Chingis but more particularly and practically by the extent to which they were able to rally around themselves the great cattle owners, the leaders of the auls. Here there was a clash of interests. The khans were eager to increase their authority over the local chiefs while the latter sought to retain the highest possible degree of independence.¹⁵ This conflict expressed itself in frequent transfers of allegiance on the part of the aul leaders to other khans.¹⁶ To a certain extent the relationship between the khans and the local chiefs was comparable to that between the chiefs and their own dependents in so far as there existed reciprocal obligations of protection on one hand and service on the other. The analogy must not, however, be pushed too far because the dependents of the local leaders were seldom sufficiently strong to defend their own interests.

The more important khans surrounded themselves with a considerable court consisting of their relatives, councillors, bodyguards, servants, and slaves.¹⁷ It is interesting to note here that Atkinson¹⁸ observes that every khan also had his merchant and mullah, both of whom were very important personages about the court. Some of the khans entered actively or through their agents into commercial relations with the settled regions.¹⁹ Traveling

¹² *Idem*, 395-96.

¹³ *Voyage d'Orenbourg*, 93.

¹⁴ See also Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, 3: 674.

¹⁵ Togzhanov, *O Kazakshom Feodalizme*, 128-29.

¹⁶ See also Levshin, *Description des hordes*, 393.

¹⁷ Asfendiarov, *Istoriia Kazakhtana*, 83.

¹⁸ *Oriental and Western Siberia*, 451.

¹⁹ Asfendiarov, *Istoriia Kazakhtana*, 94.

631 merchants played an important part in the diffusion of sedentary cultural traits, and it is
 643 possible also that the growth of the mercantile interests of the aristocracy tended to increase disparities of wealth between Kazak classes.²⁰

[642] It is difficult to get precise information on how the government of the khan functioned and what were the channels of administration. Although he was surrounded by a number of advisers, usually his relatives, there is little evidence of departmentalization or division of responsibility. Further there was no system of administrative units graded into a series of subdivisions. The relation between each local group and the khan was direct.²¹

651 The most important function of the khan's court, certainly from the point of view of the khan, was the collection of tribute, or taxes (albm). This took the form, not of regularized imposts, but of occasional demands. Levshin writes²² that Kazak chiefs had the right to exact tribute from their subjects in the form of cattle and other goods but such tribute was not paid according to any fixed rule and, by my information, perhaps only when the payer happened to feel the need of standing in the good graces of the khan for the sake of protection. But Levshin adds that by divers unregulated means the khans exacted from their subjects a substantial revenue.

The local leaders, however, were generally not averse to assisting in the collection of such taxes because the burden did not fall on them directly. They simply passed on the tax to their own subjects, taking advantage of the opportunity to add on a comfortable percentage which they retained for themselves. Kargabaiev could remember such taxes being discussed by his father, but his information was scanty and generalized. He was sure, however, that everyone, rich and poor alike, was expected to contribute one out of every ten sheep annually for the support of the mullah and also to donate to him all their old clothes. The last detail adds a touch of verisimilitude to an otherwise extremely bald narrative. It was also a frequent proceeding for the bij and aqsaqal to levy local taxes on their own authority.

[701] The demands for taxes arrived in the form of a decree (qarlıq) from the court of the khan. Similar decrees might be issued calling upon local officials to supply the khan with a certain number of fighting men for a particular occasion. Apart from the bodyguards and personal attendants of the khan there was no standing army. After the fighting everyone went home.

643 From what has been said above of the composition of the khanates it is obvious that there was no generally recognized principle of succession to the khan's power.²³ At his

²⁰ See also Bartold, *Turkistan*, 394, who points out that the interests of the Mongol khans coincided with those of the Moslem capitalists.

²¹ Asfendiarov, personal communication.

²² *Déscription des hordes*, 393-94.

²³ See also Bartold, *Turkistan*, 60, who in a strong criticism of Howorth writes: "... the author should have known something of nomadic life and its political organization, in which there can be no question of a regular order of succession to the throne or of elections according to legal forms, yet he seriously examines the

HUDSON: KAZAK SOCIAL STRUCTURE

63

death, according to my informants, a brother or a son might succeed or the heritage be divided among several sons. This made for smaller and smaller subdivisions until they were presently welded again into one when a particular ruler gained supremacy over the others. The death of a khan was normally followed by a civil war, with the local leaders taking sides with one or the other claimant or cautiously remaining neutral until it became clear which was likely to emerge victorious. 643

There are references²⁴ to meetings or councils to settle questions of general policy for the khanate. Such gatherings, however, cannot be said to have been of a democratic nature; Levshin²⁵ describes them as composed of the chiefs, the great warriors, the rich and the elders, "avec des troupes de curieux." The right to participate in such councils was not clearly defined; those who considered themselves entitled to do so took part and their words bore weight according to their personal prestige. It does not appear that any decisions which might be arrived at were binding upon anyone. Grodekoy²⁶ was told that the meetings "did not change their customs." 646

The loose nature of the bond between the khan and the local groups has been indicated above. It is very difficult to speak of centralized, or at least responsible, government during the greater part of Kazak history. The point which I wish to emphasize again, however, is the lack of correlation between the genealogical "tribal" groupings and the political unions. There is little evidence of any graded series of political subdivisions or hierarchy of officials. Reverting again to the diagram on page 20, the bij and aqsagal of the Davlet group, for example, were not in any way subordinate to the bij and aqsagal of the Esqqa group. The two groups were quite independent, united only in their common if tenuous allegiance to their particular khan. In any given case moreover such similarly related groups might be subject to two different khans. 642

In practice, however, there were instances of something approaching a dependence of one local group upon another, when a new uru group was in the process of development. There were for example a few families from Davlet consisting of about thirty tents who formed a semi-detached unit by themselves. They had their own headman, also called aqsagal, who regulated the affairs of his few families but was generally influenced and controlled by the bij and aqsagal of Davlet. Such a situation could doubtless be duplicated frequently. All groups were of course not of the same size and the smaller and weaker sought protection from the stronger. As the smaller groups increased in size they became independent equals of the established units.

question which of the Chingizids in one case or another had the best right to the throne, and whether the election of this or that khan was legally valid."

²⁴ Grodekoy, *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*, 35; Levshin, *Description des hordes*, 397; Pallua, *Voyages*, 1: 621-22.

²⁵ *Description des hordes*, 397.

²⁶ *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*, 35.

²⁷ Here I am giving my own inferences from the general character of the information. The informants agreed that the above statement was true in principle but could furnish no concrete illustration. Kargabiev was very uncertain about the larger political affiliations of his own group.

[140 cont.]

175 Kirghiz-Kazaks without paying duty (3).
[43]
439]

3. See Miller, History of Siberia
/Opisanie Sibirskogo Tsarstva.../,
p. 87, and Karamzin, op. cit.,
Vol. IX, p. 661.

The conquest of Siberia which took place not long after brought this people closer to the Russians.

[141] Kuchum, the last khan of Siberia, was himself a Kirghiz-Kazak. When he had made himself master of Isker by force of arms and by putting to death the princes Yediger and Bekbulat, who ruled there (1), it was indispensable that he have

1. See the Chronicles of Siberia;
Fisher's History of Siberia /Sibirskaya
Istoriya..., 1774/, introduction, article
84; Karamzin's history of the Russian
empire, Vol. IX, p. 644.

around him an army made up of his former compatriots. Thus Yermak and the companions of his adventures undoubtedly fought against the real Kazaks, or Kirghiz-Kazaks.

[721] Murtaza, Kuchum's father, was probably quite a powerful
797] sovereign, for he not only gave his son a year to conquer the land, but also sent him additional mullahs to spread the Moslem religion in Siberia (2).

2. See Miller's History of Siberia and Fisher's
History of Siberia, introduction, articles 86
and 87.

175 After Yermak, Kuchum, as we know, was driven out of
648 Isker by Seidak, who later fell into the hands of the Russians.
662 Uraz Mehmet, the tsarevitch or sultan of the Kazaks and nephew of Tevkel, who called himself khan of the Kazaks and

[147 cont.]

175 Kirghiz [-Kazak] hordes by order of Empress Anna, and induced
648 them to submit themselves to Russia. Later, as we shall see
below, he was for a long time a member of the Orenburg Com-
mission. In following government orders, he was in constant con-
tact with the Kirghiz [-Kazak] khans and sultans. He knew their
language thoroughly and kept a journal of the oral conferences he
[5] had with them. He says, in one of these journals, written in
1748, that Abulkhair, khan of the Little Horde, and Abul Mahmet,
khan of the Middle Horde, and the most distinguished sultans had
informed him of their genealogies.

We will place the three charts which we have composed
at the end of this work.

175 The first chart shows us that Djadek, one of the two
643 founders of a line, was the father of Shigai Khan, whose son was
Ishim, the same one whom, as we mentioned earlier, was khan
[2] of Turkestan when he waged war against the kungtaidji of the
Dzungar and to whom Abulgazi Baiadur went to seek refuge.

It is easy to prove that this Ishim is not some other unknown
Kazak khan, for Abul Mahmet, who gave Tevkelev this
genealogy (1) and called himself the [148] great-grandson of

1. Abul Mahmet wrote the same thing
about his origin to Prince Urusov, on
July 19, 1740. See the archives of
the Orenburg Border Commission. With
two accounts as certain as this, we can
assure our readers [148] that the
Siberian Herald /Sibirskii Vestnik/ of
1820, on page 114 of the article on the
Kazaks, is wrong in calling Abul Mahmet
the son of Kuchiuk.

Ishim, was born at the end of the 17th century, as can be seen
from many writings and other papers of this time. If we go
back from this prince to his father, his grandfather, and so forth,
we will find that Ishim in his youth and Djangir at a mature age

[148 cont.]

175 were contemporaries of the Kungtaidji Bagatyre. A second proof
643 can be added to this first one, namely, that in our table, as well as in the history, the son of Ishim is named Djangir.

In this way we find that Djadek, father of Shigai and grandfather of Ishim, lived with his brother Usiak toward the middle of the 16th century, that is, at the same time as the khan of Siberia, Kuchum, and his father, Murtaza. However, we do not know whether they were related nor whether they came from the same branch.

[14] Our knowledge does not go beyond Djadek and Usiak. In the middle of the last [18th] century, Tevkelev could not know the name of their father, because of the lapse of time since he had lived, and consequently it is still less possible to know it today.

175 From the questions we posed on this subject to Kazaks in
643 the years 1820, 1821, and 1822, we learned only that their khans
554 and sultans consider themselves the descendants of Chingis Khan. Most of the princes of upper Asia accord themselves this honor, and it is rarely without grounds. It is possible that many of the Kazak chiefs have a right to it, like many other Chingisids who received no other heritage from their strong and terrible ancestor but his name.

A bulgazi Baiadur proves that Kuchum, khan of Siberia, was descended from Sheibani, the grandson of Chingis, but Kuchum is known to have been a Kazak sultan, and therefore it is not surprising that other Kazak khans and sultans are also descended from Sheibani. Following [149] this first manuscript chart, if we go down from Ishim and Djangir, whose existence is known to us, to times closer to our own, we see that after Djangir comes his son, Khan Tiavka.

175 On hearing the name of this prince, the heart of every
643 Kazak capable, through intelligence, of rising above his turbulent
728 compatriots is filled with gratitude and veneration. He is the
669 Lycurgus and Draco of the Kazak hordes. Once more he brought peace among them after the bloody dissensions. He stopped the

[149 cont.]

175 bloodshed caused for several years by the quarrels of certain
643 tribes among themselves. He compelled everyone to obey him
728 by his wisdom and equity. He caused the weak tribes to reunite
669 in order to resist the strong ones, and forced the latter to be
peaceful. He gave them all the laws by which he judged them,
and their memory is still preserved among the wisest Kazaks, but
unfortunately they are not carried out (1).

1. See the article on the form of govern-
ment in the statistical section /of this
book/. [Not translated.]

175 In spite of all his services and his influence among the
643 hordes, Tiavka apparently did not enjoy wide power over his
people, and used prudence, experience, his connections, and
his cleverness more than force. As leader of all the Kazaks, he
lived in Turkestan, as did his father and grandfather. He chose
three chiefs, whom he held dependent upon himself, to govern
and watch over each particular horde. These were: Tiul, in
the Great Horde, Kazbek in the Middle Horde, and Aitiak in
the Little Horde.

175 We speak here of the division of the Kazak people into
631 three hordes, without having said when and how this took place.
173 Unfortunately, this event is a mystery to us, and we have no way
of determining anything in this regard. We do not know how much
to believe of a folk tradition which says that a powerful Kazak
khan divided all his people among his three sons, and that those
[150] given the eldest son were called the Great Horde, those
to the second, the Middle Horde, and those to the youngest son,
the Little Horde (1).

1. The Kazaks translate the word "horde" by iuz,
which means "hundred" or "century." This
is why they say ulu-iuz ("the great hundred"),
urta-iuz ("the middle hundred"). However
the word iuz also has other meanings in Turkic.

175 [150 cont.]

631 We could not find any information on Pulat, son of Khan
173 Tiavka and father of Abul Mahmet, who is found in the table.

175 The traditions say only that the calm re-established by
721 Tiavka did not last long among the Kazaks. Dissensions and troubles began again, and the neighboring peoples were quick to profit from them. On the west they were attacked by the Volga Kalmuks [Kalmyk], and on the north by the Bashkirs and the Cossacks of Siberia. But the most terrible of all were the Dzungars to the east. At this time their chief was the powerful Kungtaidji Galdan Tsyren, who not only made all the nomadic peoples tremble but also spread terror in Russia and China. In this unfortunate situation, the Kazaks could not expect help except from the power of Peter the Great, whose vast genius, concerned with the glory and welfare of his people, watched over the Asian border while he had the most important dealings in Europe.

175 Prince Gagarin was governor of Siberia at that time. The
648 Tsar commanded him not only to open relations with the Kazaks,
662 but to help them, if possible, against Galdan Tsyren, in order to put some check on the continual increase of power of the Dzungarian leader. Gagarin carried out the Tsar's commands in 1717, and the Kazak khans, Tiavka, Kaip, and Abulkhair (2)

2. We have drawn this information from works and translations /Sochineniia i Perevody, k Polze i Uveseleniiu Sluzhashchiia/ of January, 1760. See the article on the "golden saber" /Izvestie o pesotnom zolote v Bukharii... (On the Gold Dust in Bukharo)/. The Khan Tiavka in question must be the famous legislator of the Kazaks of whom we have spoken. But at this time he was already very old. His weakness and the loss of power which ensued, were no doubt the cause of the election, while he still lived, of the khans Abulkhair and Kaip, whose names we see here for the first time (the year 1717).

[150 cont.]

175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
649 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and
most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know
enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining
together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[57] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of
the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that
is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had
offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of
Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-
Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it
waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was
made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg
/Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov
does not say who commanded the Kazaks
in this expedition, but Nepluev says that
it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became
a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished,
although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and
alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to
it by the governor of Kazan is still pre-
served today /1832/ in the archives of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

175 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of
721 the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant
726

[152 cont.]

175 their wives and children. Finally, the fugitives halted, but in
[167] barren localities offering no support to a nomadic people. It
73] was impossible for the Kazaks to endure such an unhappy situa-
tion for long. Of the two scourges which menaced them, it was
best to choose the one which promised some advantages, if not
for the present at least for the future. Despair drove them to
make themselves masters of their old territories, which they could
not do without. Danger had snuffed out the flame of dissension
and replaced it with unanimity of sentiment, and the efforts of all
[64] were directed to the same end. It was decided in a general as-
sembly of the people to advance, attack the common enemies,
and drive them from the lands of the Kazaks. This undertaking
was sanctified at once by a common oath to remain faithful to
●[643] each other. Khan Abulkhair was chosen as [153] leader of the
782] nation, and the sacrifice of a white horse (1), which was made

1. See the article on "Customs" in the
statistical section of this book, for more
details. [Not translated.]

according to the custom of this people, was considered a pledge
of future peace.

[726] After these preparations the Kazaks advanced, attacked the
Dzungas, and won a number of battles against them, and re-
[727] covered their old lands. But as they expected new attacks from
Galdan Tsyren, they found it more opportune to move away from
this dangerous neighbor, and some retreated to the north, while
others moved westward. Only the Great Horde remained near the
Dzungars, and they submitted to the latter almost in entirety, as
we shall soon see. The Little Horde did not stop at the Emba
175 River, which was formerly the border, when they arrived there,
166 but crossed over to the right bank and attacked the Volga
726 Kalmuks, and after seizing a large part of their pasture lands,
they moved all the way to the Ural River. The Middle Horde
moved north to the Ori and the Ui, and drove out many Bashkirs
from the vicinity of these rivers. Although the strength of the

[165 cont.]

Chapter V. Historical Studies of the Kirghiz-
Kazak Middle and Little Hordes from
1730 until our Times (1832).

*648 The events which have taken place among the Middle and Little Hordes since their union with Russia are so interrelated that it is impossible to separate them. For this reason we are combining into a single description the historical account we wish to give our readers concerning these two hordes from the year 1730 until our times.

At the end of Chapter III we said that the Kazaks who refused to submit to Russia at a time when the public interest would have forced them to do so later became subjects of Empress Anna for the personal advantage of a single individual.

*648
●643 This individual was Khan Abulkhair, of whom we have already spoken. He was chief of a large part of the Little Horde, and his power extended over some tribes of the Middle Horde, and he had the well-being of his people in mind. But he thought [662] still more about means of consolidating his power and rising above his rivals and enemies, especially above Khan Kaip, who also ruled over a part of the Little Horde.

The situation of the Kazaks in 1730 favored Abulkhair's ambitions. His subjects were enervated by frequent losses of men and goods; hemmed in on all sides by their neighbors, who warred against them; and expected [166] new misfortunes at every moment; and they were ready then for any sacrifice. The Khan knew how to profit from their frame of mind, and he announced to them definitively that there was no way out except voluntary submission to Russia.

648
662 ... At fi this proposition was rejected, but Abulkhair no doubt knew how to point out, with such paternal solicitude and persistence, the misfortunes which menaced the Kazaks without the support of Russia; he depicted them so vividly and his arguments were so convincing that they were irresistible. When Abulkhair's adherents had compared the remote advantages they

⁷⁴⁸ [189 cont.]

⁴³⁷
⁵⁷⁷ our border by Kazaks of the Little Horde. Such were the first proofs of the [190] protection of our trade in Asia promised by Khan Abulkhair.

⁴⁴³ A second proof of the impotence of the princes, or rather the Kazak chiefs, was seen in 1740 when Karasakal, chief of the Bashkir rebels, fled beyond the Yaik with his accomplices. The Khan and the sultans absolutely refused to arrest these deserters.

All these circumstances, and particularly the pillage of the caravans, caused Abulkhair to be embarrassed about appearing in Orenburg in 1740 for a meeting with Prince Urusov, and he sent excuses that he was ill and too far away.

To these two reasons, which he gave openly, a third must be added, which was secret. He knew that at this time Abul Mahmet, new khan of the Middle Horde, was expected in Orenburg.

⁵⁵⁴ This man was his enemy and one over whom he had pre-eminence, and he was afraid of seeing the other treated as his equal. But in order to avoid reproaches and dispel suspicions, he sent the Sultans Nurali and Erali, his sons, to Prince Urusov.

On this occasion they were received with all the honors which had been shown their father two years before. The Kazaks ⁵⁷⁴
⁵⁷⁶ who accompanied them were also treated with special regard. Seventy-five elders dined at the table of the chief [Prince Urusov?], and food and beer were distributed to the persons of their suite outdoors.

Although Sultan Nurali was at that time a grown-up man, yet his father had given him as a preceptor during his trip to Russia a man, Batyr Djanibek, who was universally esteemed among the Kazaks and known for his wit. He was received in Orenburg practically as an equal of the sultans, and with them received rich gifts at the first meeting in the name of the Russian government.

⁵⁷⁴ The first visit of the Khan's sons to Prince Urusov was only a ceremonial visit and an exchange of pleasantries. At the second meeting the affairs of the horde were discussed. [191] They ex-

⁶²⁸ plained that the first caravan sent by Tatishchev was pillaged by the Great Horde, over which they had not the slightest influence.

[199 cont.]

^x448 of Abul Mahmet. When the interpreter Urazlin arrived, sent
662 him by Nepluev, Abul Mahmet frankly admitted the reason for
his sudden return from the outskirts of Orenburg and then confessed
that fear had made him give his son as hostage to Galdan, after
which he swore loyalty to Empress Elizabeth. It was in this same
year of 1742 that Barak, the powerful Kazak sultan, swore the
oath to the Russian government for the first time, at the same
time as Abul Mahmet. He was the leader of a large part of the
Middle Horde, and his subjects gave him the title of khan.

• [643] As an independent sovereign, he sent deputies to Orenburg
after the oath with the request that they be directed to the court,
so that they might present his respects to the Empress in person
and in his name.

[644
437] Several months later he showed how insincere this submission
was. His deputies were presented to Elizabeth, allowed to kiss
her hand, and were overwhelmed with favors and gifts. He him-
self was sent, through the government of Orenburg, a letter (1)

1. This letter was presented March 24,
1743.

and a golden saber with an inscription to him. Nepluev, who
had never seen Barak and knew that he had had no previous rela-
tions with Russia, felt obligated to deliver the marks of favor from
the Empress, and with this intention he sent him a messenger, who
left with his ambassadors to invite him to come to Orenburg.

[574] [200] The proud sultan was angry because the letter and the saber
had not been brought by his own embassy and ordered various rude
things said to Nepluev's officer, sending him back without having
seen him. The primary cause of the gross insolence can only be
attributed to Barak's blind pride, and the secondary one can be
considered to be the fact that no other gift except the saber ac-
companied the letter.

Sultan Ablai, who had languished about a year as a prisoner
of the Dzungars, was finally liberated in the spring of 1742,
thanks to the efforts of Major Müller, who had been sent to Galdan.

x [206 cont.]

648 him in the name of the Empress (1) to make Abulkhair refuse it,

1. Ukase of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of October 21, 1745.

but the latter would not have paid any attention to his advice if other circumstances had not prevented him from acceding to the wishes of the Khivans. Nurali received a letter from the son of the Shah of Persia inviting him to come to him. This prince considered the khanate of Khiva his property, being the conqueror. Nurali was on the point of departing for Khiva when his wife, whom he had left in that city, sent word that the Persians were only inviting him there in order to put him to death (2). This news kept

2. Continuation of the history of Orenburg
by Rychkov, events of 1745.

him back with his father.

647 Meanwhile the leaders of the Middle Horde, who had had no relation with Russia for nearly two years, approached the Russian border and renewed their assurances of devotion to the Empress. Abul Mahmet left Turkestan to join his horde and sent a messenger to St. Petersburg to volunteer his services; later he renewed his oath of loyalty. Sultan Barak did likewise. He also sent an embassy to St. Petersburg.

668 The Kazaks were not yet at peace when disturbances took place in the Volga Kalmuk horde. The rumor spread that a large section wished to leave Russia, on the invitation of Galdan Tsyren, to join their compatriots, the Dzungars. This rumor, which was confirmed in fact 26 years later, was false at this time, but it disturbed the government, especially when the news

had been received from the Ural that a large number of Kalmuks had crossed over from the Russian bank to the Kazak side, and

[207] when reports from Siberia stated that the Dzungarian

626 armies had reached the Irtysh /River/ in some places. Subsequent
727 events showed that the passage of the Kalmuks across the Ural

[210 cont.]

⁶⁴⁸
[662] dispatched several trusted Kazaks to propose the marriage of his daughter to the Dzungarian sovereign.

[662] As the Russian government, which was still unaware of this last step taken by Abulkhair, awaited the execution of his promises, it was informed that he had been assassinated.

These are the circumstances which preceded his death.

[726] When he returned from the fortress of Orsk to the auls, he assembled a band of armed Kazaks and moved at their head to pillage the unfortunate Karakalpaks, who had already suffered so much from him and his son. He met Sultan Barak, who had long hated him and who envied him the marks of distinction and the prerogatives which had been granted him by the Russian government. He held a grudge against Abulkhair particularly because

[579] the latter had pillaged the gifts he had been sent by the khan of
[643] Khiva. In addition, both claimed rights of sovereignty over the Karakalpaks who had established themselves in the Kazak horde. Both were violent and vindictive, and consequently their meeting could not take place without a quarrel.

Barak, who had more people with him, was the first to open combat. Abulkhair's band, which was less numerous, could not withstand the first encounter and took to flight, and the Khan, who was carried away by the fugitives, was obliged to follow their example. But Shigai [211] the sultan, son of Barak, overtook him and unhorsed him with a blow of his spear. Then Barak himself arrived and assuaged his bloody rage by killing his enemy with his own hands (1).

1. We have drawn this information from Tevkelev's journals, which are preserved in Orenburg in the archives of the Border Commission.

[726] Although the Karakalpaks had suffered much from Abulkhair, his death only brought them a new blow instead of bringing them relief. For Barak, delivered from his rival, did not miss the chance to attack them and pillage them.

[212 cont.]

^{x 648}
[643] This measure was fully successful. Nurali was proclaimed khan in an assembly of the people, and they sent to the court Sultan Djanibek and several distinguished Kazaks, who came to bring this news to Orenburg. They said they had been sent on behalf of the Middle and the Little Hordes, and requested therefore that Khan Nurali be named khan of the two hordes. Several reasons made it impossible to satisfy this request. 1) The Russian officer who presided at the election of Nurali stated that Djanibek Batyr was the only elder of the Middle Horde who had taken part, and that he had always lived near Abulkhair, as had several tens of ordinary Kazaks who had long been separated from the Middle Horde and who also lived among the subjects of Abulkhair. 2) Al-
[661]
[668] most all the most distinguished sultans of the Middle Horde had either their sons or their closest kinsmen as hostages with the Dzungarian prince, who from that moment had begun to raise claims to sovereignty over the entire horde, and this caused the Russian government grave suspicions as to the obedience of that horde.

On the other hand they did not wish to vex Nurali by presenting a formal refusal to the request of his ambassador, and it
[643] was decided to name him khan of the Kazaks without designating any horde. On the day of February 26, 1749, he was sent the imperial letter patent concerning his new office. At the same time another letter patent was sent in the name of the Kazak people to confirm their choice, and Nepluev was enjoined to invite Nurali to come to Orenburg and to proclaim him khan there in an imposing manner.

[662] Before speaking of this ceremony, we will say that [213] Nepluev and Tevkelev were aided in their design to cause Nurali's election by his mother, Khaness Papai, who by her intelligence had won the respect of the entire Little Horde and sometimes had much influence upon its administration. Because she liked the Russians, she had often dissuaded her husband Abulkhair from carrying out plans which were harmful to Russia (1). All this

[562] 1. She possessed a stamp with her name,

^{Y 648} [213 cont.]

[562]

which was an absolutely extraordinary distinction among a people accustomed to treating their women as slaves, for they are not allowed to take any part in public affairs.

[62] was brought to the knowledge of the court, and when Djanibek returned to the horde, he delivered a letter to her from the [43] Chancellor, accompanied by a piece of precious brocade from the Empress.

[72] At the same time as Nurali's election it was learned in St. Petersburg that the Dzungars, at the instigation of Sultan Barak, wished to attack the Little Horde. Although it was later proved that this rumor was false, measures were nevertheless taken to protect the horde from attack.

¹⁶¹⁸
⁶⁴³ At Nepluev's invitation, Khan Nurali arrived near Orenburg in the month of July, 1749, escorted by the most distinguished sultans and elders and many commoners. He stopped on the left bank of the Ural River, where a camp had been prepared in advance in order to make a ceremony of his elevation with éclat. Like his father, he was received at the camp with the firing of cannon and with music. The ceremony began with the reading of the letters patent given to him and to his people. Next he was presented with a robe, a cap, and a saber sent by the court. Finally, the new khan knelt and swore an oath of fealty to Russia upon the Koran.

We will not give the details of this ceremony here, because they were repeated at every new elevation, and we will describe it elsewhere in the article on the customs and ceremonies of the Kazaks (2).

2. See Part III [this particular section on customs not translated].

^{X 648}

[64]

[214] Having become the khan, Nurali demonstrated that he would not be content with the title but also wished to have the authority. His first request to the Russian government was to

[221 cont.]

⁷⁰⁴³ [221] ordered that these stipends were not to start being paid until he had returned all the Russian prisoners and the Volga Kalmuks, or at least most of them. It was supposed that this would be carried out soon, but it turned out completely otherwise, and Nurali did not receive his stipends until five years after they had been assigned to him.

[222] At the beginning of 1750, Sultan Aichuvak, brother of the Khan, devised a plan, together with his father's friends, Batyr Djanibek, and a numerous band, composed partly of people of the Middle Horde but mostly made up of members of the Little Horde, to attack a people who lived near the Aral Sea and who were called the Aral people. These people were few in number and unaccustomed to war. One can easily guess that

[223] Aichuvak and his accomplices were successful in their enterprise and that they returned home with a large number of prisoners, studs of strange horses, and with many objects of different kinds which they had seized. But the Aral people were subjects of the khan of Khiva, who did not care to let the damage done to them pass without amends. Consequently he took into custody a large number of Nurali's subjects who had come to trade at the market in Khiva, and even his ambassador was arrested. There was no other way of releasing them than to return to the Aral people at least part of what they had lost, and especially the prisoners.

[224] Shortly after this, Sultan Erali, following the example of his brother, attacked the Karakalpaks. But the troops which served as his army were too few, and in place of the booty he hoped for, he was taken prisoner and most of his companions were killed.

After having freed him, at the end of several months, Nurali arrived in Orenburg to see Nepluev and Tевкелев, but his journey did not have any important consequence.

[225] Intercourse between the Middle Horde and Russia rarely

¹¹⁶⁴ took place at that time. Their khan, Abul Mahmet, had retreated to Turkestan where he lived until his death without being heard from; and Barak, as we have said, had been imprisoned /poisoned/. The successors to their power had not yet made the

[222 cont.]

X⁶⁴⁸
● [73] acquaintance of the Russians. Sultan Kuchak, who had been proclaimed khan by several tribes, had not been confirmed by Russia and had not even sought her protection. The good graces of the Dzungarian prince were more necessary to him, as they were to all [223] the sultans of the Middle Horde. Only Ablai [42] failed to renounce the protection of Russia, in spite of his secret relations with the Dzungars, for most of his subjects lived near the Russian border, and he sensed how useful it was to him to remain on good terms with Russia.

[439] Since he had to look out for the advantages of trade with the Russians in addition to the interests of his security, he requested that a market be opened in the fort of Troitsk, saying that Orenburg was too far away for him and particularly for most of his subjects to go there.

Batyr Djanibek, who had moved away from Orenburg after Abulkhair's death, asked for the same thing. The fulfillment of this request was equally advantageous to the Russian government, giving it greater means of surveillance over the Great Horde, and consequently a trade market was opened at Troitsk in 1750.

Before his death Galdan Tsyren had become reconciled with the Kazaks and seemed to wish to attach them to him more by kindness and good deeds than by terror. But his son had an entirely [72] different view of the matter and renewed his attacks. The Middle Horde especially suffered greatly in 1751 near the Ulu [166] Mountains. The considerable loss of men taken prisoner by the [727] Dzungars made it necessary for most of this horde to come closer to the Russian border and almost to mix with the Little Horde, after reaching the Ori River and the Mugodzhaz Hills.

[439] In 1752 Russia's relations with Nurali Khan had less to do with Kazak matters than with the expansion of caravan trade with Khiva, the dominion of Bukhara, and Tashkent, and across these lands with the other states of Central Asia, even to the Indies,

which were regarded as the source of all riches. Since the Indies were not far from the Kazak steppes, it was wished to make the first step across this country to reach that [224] region. This is why Nurali's help, if he were to give it in good faith, would have been of great importance to Russia in connection with trade.

[224 cont.]

^x648
[67] With this in mind he was granted several favors, including the fact that his youngest son, aged three, was accepted as hostage in place of his eldest, Sultan Pirali.

[67] To this same end there was a return to the thought expressed by Empress Anna in her ukase to Kirilov, dated February 11, 1736, an idea which was in accord with what we mentioned earlier concerning Abulkhair's wish, to build a city at the mouth of the Syr Darya and to begin its population with criminals condemned to exile. But all these projects were unsuccessful.

^x648
578 The hatred of the Khans Abulkhair and Kaip, which had been known since the beginning of the 17th century, was not extinguished by their death, but was left as a heritage to their children and their children's children. We shall see in the course of this work that it has not only not been entirely eliminated today, but even has not weakened among the principal descendants of these two chiefs. But before speaking of these contemporaries, we shall describe the history of their ancestors. The constancy with which these two families have hated each other and pursued each other for a hundred years merits special attention. This hatred may go back even farther, perhaps, for we do not know what sentiments existed between Abulkhair's father and Kaip's father.

^x648 We have already said that Sultan Batyr, son of Kaip, and his son, the khan of Khiva, had sent ambassadors to Orenburg for the first time in 1650/1750/. Although their proposals were not accepted, being prejudicial to Khan Nurali, who was recognized by Russia, nevertheless the arrival of Batyr's envoys and their intentions of allying themselves with the Russians gave birth to suspicions in Nurali's heart and reignited his hereditary hatred for Batyr. Furthermore he could not view with composure the fact that in spite of the refusal of the [225] Russian government to send all the caravans in general across Batyr's pasture lands, his son, the khan of Khiva, had forbidden his subjects to

go from Khiva to Orenburg and to return by a route other than that of the lands of his father. This measure diminished Nurali's influence over trade and the revenues which he took in, like all the Kazak khans, based on the notion of a right over merchandise passing through their steppes.

[231 cont.]

x 648 Fortunately this region was then governed by Nepluev. His presence of mind and his actions averted the storm which
 643 menaced it. He immediately united the troops under his com-
 722 mand at the points where defense was most necessary. He had reinforcements brought in from Kazan and also drew them from the Don Cossacks and from the khan of the Volga Kalmuks. While waiting, he armed the Meshcheriaks and Teptiars against the Bashkirs. He promised a complete pardon to those rebels who showed signs of repentance, and offered large pecuniary rewards for the heads of Batyr Shah and his principal accomplices. He sent declarations in the Tatar language to the Kazak hordes in the name of the akhun of Orenburg, in which this senior member of the Moslem clergy expressed his approbation of the Bashkir revolt but at the same time his fear that if they came to make themselves independent of Russia they might attack the Kazaks and finish by conquering them.

629 When the auxiliary troops had entered the land of the Bashkirs, the latter were not powerful enough to resist the Russians, Kalmuks, Teptiars, and Meshcheriaks together, and they fled across the Ural River with their wives and children, numbering more than 50,000 persons. A large number perished crossing the river, and the others concealed themselves within the hordes.

627 Those who remained in their settlements asked pardon, but their
 662 repentance was not sincere, and they were waiting for a new revolt. To avert this, and above all to prevent the Bashkirs from joining the Kazaks, Nepluev was obliged to take a cruel measure, but one which the times and circumstances made absolutely necessary.

x 648 He felt that it was necessary, for the security of the [232]
 662 Orenburg line, to cause an irreconcilable hatred between the
 661 Bashkirs and the Kazaks, for without this a reunion between them was always possible, and the inevitable result of such an alliance would be the ruin of all the Russian establishments on the Ural River. To achieve this end, he decided to place in the power

Kazaks the wives and children of the Bashkirs who Russia
 to seek refuge among the Kazaks. Elizabeth's ministry had wished to protect the Russian border by a method more consistent with the views of kindness and humanity, but it was necessary to yield to

[240 cont.]

^x648 not ceased their thieving and laid waste the border provinces as before. But the departure of the Kazaks would have been very [439] injurious in regard to trade, and it was to prevent this that Russia wished to keep her semisavage subjects in their old habitat.

[62] It was essential to keep Sultan Ablai well disposed toward [43] Russia, for he was acquiring more influence over his subjects every day and was becoming more fitted than anyone else to drive them in some high undertaking. A large part of the Middle Horde had already given him the title of khan. He himself in his relations with the Russian authorities did not yet give himself more than the title of sultan. But his power and his rank as a Chinese prince, to which Ch'ien Lung had elevated him, made it easier for him to change his title and to adopt that of supreme chief of all the Middle Horde, without any permission or cooperation on the part of Russia. This manner of behavior would have been contrary to the dignity of the empire, for the Middle Horde was among its subjects. But it was impossible to prevent such an event by [241] prohibiting it, and it would have been too injurious to take revenge by force of arms. It was therefore decided to induce Ablai by kindness and favors to himself request his investiture with the title of khan in the name of his people. In anticipation of this request, he was assigned an annual stipend, and an officer was sent to him charged with subtly showing him the path by which he could acquire the position of khan and to inform him that in order to reach this goal it was necessary that he give his son as hostage, following the example of Nurali.

Against all expectations Ablai received the Russian envoy in a very unfriendly manner and refused to present his son. In addition, it was learned soon after from a reliable source that Abul Mahmet, who had been created the khan of the Middle Horde by Russia, was still alive, and therefore the elevation of a new khan was put off to another time.

in 1767 In 1760 the Kirghiz-Kazaks of the Middle Horde attacked the savage Kirgiz, or Buruts, and inflicted great losses upon them. [7] Later they caused a disturbance in a sector of the new conquests of China and took several prisoners there. The Chinese demanded

x [248 cont.]

648 secure hostages from Ablai to guarantee the freedom of the
[661] Russians sent to him.

648 Khan Nurali, who was proud of his relations with the army
662 of the Afghans and with China, wrote directly to the Empress in
1764, both to inform her of the invitation sent him by all the
Moslems of Central Asia to take part in the war against China
and also to acquaint her with the distinguished reception his
embassy had had in Peking. These two circumstances inflated
his vanity, and in his dreams of [249] his importance, he thought
he could exact several concessions which he had already been
refused. However, these repeated demands had no more success
than they had had the first time. He was sent thanks from Russia
for the news he had provided about the Afghans, and several gifts
were added with a reply which was as polite as it was lacking in
satisfaction. His horde did not remain calm, however, but con-
[721] tinued its raids against the Volga Kalmuks as much as against
the Russian settlements on the border, nor did they renounce their
usual dissensions, which are not worth a detailed description.
Thus passed the years 1765 and 1766. In 1767 Russian troops
punished them in a clear manner, by pursuing the brigands to the
very middle of the horde.

x 648 There is no doubt that this chastisement made Nurali
662 violently angry. Since he needed Catherine's good graces, how-
643 ever, he hid his resentment for a long time. He was afraid that
after his death the position of khan might pass to another family,
and asked that a successor or deputy be designated while he still
lived and that the Russian government ceremonially elevate his
eldest son, Ishim, to this new post. This was a new desire,
but it was not in opposition to Russian views. It was true that
Russia could designate one of Nurali's brothers as khan of the
Little Horde if she chose. But since there was no reason then for
preferring them above other sultans and since the Empress Anna,
when she promised Abulkhair to preserve the post of khan for

posterity, did not fix any rule for the choice of his successors,
Nurali's wish could be fulfilled. Also the particular qualities of
Sultan Ishim were no obstacle to the accomplishment of his

[249 cont.]

father's aims. It was only necessary to know whether the creation of a deputy of the khan would not make the Kazaks discontented and whether they might not refuse to recognize their future chief. It was also necessary to know what [250] Ishim's personal inclinations toward Russia were and whether this novelty might not lead to some unpleasant consequences for her. It was ordered that research be made at the horde itself on all these points and that the results be sent to Petersburg. The authorities in Orenburg replied that according to the custom of the Kazaks, the position of khan should pass to one of his brothers after the death of Nurali and not to one of his sons. The Minister answered that the law of succession in private life could not be applied to succession to the title of khan, because this title always passed from one man to another by the choice of the people. Nevertheless it was decided, in order to avoid grumbling and dissension, to induce the Kazaks to choose Sultan Ishim themselves as the deputy of the khan and to confirm the choice of the people afterwards.

While studies were being made on this subject and the correspondence continued, the year 1771 arrived and the desertion of the Kalmuks caused the Kazaks matters to be forgotten, not only by the government but by the Kazaks themselves, as we will see later. This is why Khan Nurali's plan to elevate his son to the post of his deputy remained unfulfilled.

He could have attained his end if the death of his son, who arrived in Orenburg in 1769 where he was held as hostage, had not grieved him sorely and had not driven him into a stubbornness which was forgivable for a father but unpleasant for the Russian government. It was the second son he had lost in Orenburg, and both had died as children. Attributing their deaths to lack of care, he did not wish under any circumstances to give up another child of his own as hostage. And he himself refused to come to Orenburg, although he was invited to come several times by the authorities for conferences. Certain quarrels which arose between him and his brothers increased his troubles. The envy caused by

the marks of attention given them by the Russian government, by making them more than it did him in its relations with the Little

K
[27]H

K [257 cont.]
x 648 C
648 C
K
[669]
662] undefended. No one could protect them from the raids of outside enemies, for everyone thought about saving himself from an enemy from within who was far more dangerous. This is why there was reason to fear then that the Kazaks [258] might join the rebels, enter the empire, and pillage and lay waste all the border settlements. This did not happen because the Yaik Cossacks and the Bashkirs who made up Pugachev's army were enemies of the Kazaks.

Nevertheless, if this hatred prevented them from joining together to march into the interior, it did not protect the borders from the usual pillaging and raids which the Little Horde often repeated during Pugachev's revolt.

We see by a report from the commander who was then in the city of Yaisk (now Uralsk) that Nurali had armed quite a large number of his subjects but was making no move, waiting near the border for the outcome of the affair. One might suppose from the assurances he gave and the zeal with which he extradited several rebels who had taken flight that it was his intention to decide for the legitimate government, but in spite of this the local authorities were very much afraid that in case good luck favored the leader of the insurrection, Nurali might join him.

On this basis and to punish several raids, some across the borders, by the Kazaks during the revolt, the government of Orenburg sent a body of troops against the Little Horde in 1774, after the defeat of the rebels. These troops succeeded in capturing a large number of prisoners, carrying off many animals, and made the audacious bandits feel Russia's might.

K
● [643]
651] At this same time an event took place in the interior of the Little Horde which is worthy of attention. Several Turkmen tribes who nomadized near the Caspian Sea chose Sultan Pirali, the second son of Nurali, for their khan. The new sovereign immediately left his father and went to live in the midst of his new subjects on the route which led from Khiva to Saraichik

259] and Guryev. He soon made a name for himself through the high duties he exacted from the merchant caravans.

In 1775 the Kazaks did not disturb Russia. The Little Horde remained quiet because it still felt the painful consequences

ber
not
[643] eff
and

[260 cont.]

x 648
[439]

subject on December 17, 1775, the geodetic specialist Vasiliev drew a map of the environs of the Emba and the rivers which flowed into it.

execution, as had all the others which had been made previously.

[727]

It can be seen in the reports from the governor of Orenburg, Reinsdorf, to the Empress in the months of March and April, 1776 that the Little Horde had once more begun acts of hostility against Russia, and although after the Russian troops entered the steppes in 1774, the border authorities had been forbidden to send troops beyond the Ural, yet Khan Nurali himself had asked for armed assistance to bring his restless subjects to their senses.

[662]

Sultan Ablai, on the contrary, was then becoming more powerful, older, and wiler from day to day. Having had more experience than any of the contemporary Kazak princes and being known for his intelligence, dreaded by his subjects, and distinguished for his ties with the empress of Russia and the emperor of China (2) /sic/,

2. The best known among them was Sultan Dair, son of Barak, who complained to the governor of Orenburg that Ablai had unjustly usurped the title of khan.

he had every possible right to the post of chief of the Middle Horde. Sure of his ability, he knew how to attract followers by his importance and his prudent behavior. He threatened his enemies with his power and acknowledged himself now a subject of Russia and now that of China (3), depending on the occasion,

3. Some Kazaks who came within our borders stated that Ablai spoke Chinese.

being in fact a completely independent sovereign. One can see this especially after the year 1771, when he made less effort to conserve appearances of an external submission to Russia, having become less hypocritical, he openly took the title of khan.

[261]

^x648
643 The Russian government asked him by what right he had taken this title, and he boldly replied that he had acquired it by his victories over the Torguts and, after the death of Abul Mahmet, not only by the choice of the Kazak hordes but also by that of the residents of Turkestan and Tashkent. He added that following the example of his independent ancestors and the khans who were his predecessors, he wished to live in Turkestan near the tomb of Khodja Akhmet (1). It was then too late to remind

1. The Kazaks regard Khodja Akhmet, who is buried in /the town of/ Turkestan, as the greatest saint after Mohammed.

Ablai of the obligations of a faithful subject. But it was necessary at least to sustain the idea in the hordes that no one could become khan in one of them without the consent of Russia. The Empress ordered that an officer be sent to Ablai to induce him especially to request the confirmation of his new position from the Russian government.

[66] He consented to this proposal and promised to send his son, Sultan Tugum, to St. Petersburg.

On November 25, 1777, it was officially announced to him that the Empress had agreed to his request, if he would transmit it in writing rather than orally. It was ordered to return his son from the border to the horde in the opposite case.

Ablai made not the slightest opposition to sending a written request. Consequently, Sultan Tugum, who conveyed it to St. Petersburg, was received most graciously, and his father was confirmed as khan by a certificate on October 22, 1778.

This certificate was sent to Orenburg, accompanied by a robe of honor, a saber, and a hat, and Ablai was invited to present himself to receive them and to swear the oath in Orenburg, Troitsk, or on the Siberian line. But when he refused to come, the Russian government consented to his taking the oath in the horde in the presence of a Russian officer, who would then

[261 cont.]

x 648 deliver the objects.. Ablai did not wish to swear a new oath of
643 loyalty even under this condition. He believed that the demand that was being made for these [262] external signs of submission had the goal of rendering him suspect to the Chinese, to whom he was then particularly attached. For this reason all the proposals which Russia made him were fruitless, and the certificate and the marks of the position of khan remained at the fort of Petropavlovsk, opposite which he lived in the house which the Russian government had had built for him.

x 648 Ablai's disobedience became more patent when the Russian
662 government turned down his request for aid in men to make war against the Buruts, and he openly refused to return the Russian prisoners in his horde, as well as the Turkmen whom the Kalmuks had taken away from the Astrakhan government in their flight and who had remained with the Kazaks. The government was justly annoyed by Ablai's audacity and insolence, and withdrew his stipend and sought to humble him by supporting one of the sultans among his enemies. Measures had even been taken to this effect, and it was thought for a moment to take him prisoner [271] and send him into the interior of Russia. But at this time he assembled troops, attacked the Buruts, delivered a severe defeat to them, took hostages from them, and returned to nomadize in the environs of Turkestan.

x 648 While he was living there, he built a house surrounded by a
[361] rampart on the little river Talash, near the Ulu-Tau Mountains for his son, Sultan Hadil, and at the entreaty of his Kazak subjects of the Great horde, he founded a village nearby, which he populated with Karakalpaks who were accustomed to agriculture. As [66] for the Buruts he had captured, he made them go north of the Middle Horde, where they are still living today with their children, making up the tribe of the Djany or Iany-Kirgiz, which means New Kirgiz.

[764] In 1781 Ablai returned toward the Russian frontier, but he died on the way at the age of 70 and was buried in Turkestan. As soon as this news arrived in Peking, the Chinese government

[262 cont.]

⁶⁴⁹
[74] sent a [263] high officer to the horde, who joined the family of the deceased and celebrated a ceremonial funeral service in its presence.

Thus ended Ablai's relations with Russia. Although the disobedience of this prince in the last years of his life was open, yet [721] it had no important consequences. The Little Horde, whose [579] seemed entirely devoted to Russia and proved this by his actions, was much more disturbing to the borders, as it continued its raids and brigandage as usual. As we saw earlier, in 1775 the Empress had forbidden the sending of troops beyond the Ural to chastise the Kazaks, and although not only the Orenburg authorities but the Khan himself had asked that this measure be employed again in 1776, it was not done. The supreme government had made up its mind to substitute gentle means for severity. This system, which was so favorable to the Kazaks, did not last long. Their plundering forced it to be changed. Nurali himself again declared the absolute urgency of punishing the guilty persons. As a result, on October 4, 1779, the Empress gave orders to the governor of Orenburg, by a rescript, not only to pursue the bandits with armed force, but, as before, to seize their kinsmen if necessary, or even their neighbors, so that the families of these neighbors would make an effort to deliver the guilty persons or at least to force the return of the Russians who had been held prisoner.

[721] According to tradition, the southern part of the Middle Horde [727] underwent a terrible defeat from the Great Horde after Ablai's death, being attacked and having many animals taken away. Those who had suffered did not remain quiet but avenged themselves upon their enemies. The northern part of the Middle Horde took no part in these reprisals. This horde chose as the successor to Ablai his son Vali, and the latter esteemed the protection of Russia and did not wish to be at odds with her. As a result he ⁶⁴⁸ asked her to [264] confirm his new position. His request was fulfilled, and in 1782 he was proclaimed the khan of the Middle ⁶⁴³ Horde by Lieutenant General Jacobs in the fort of Petropavlovsk. The ceremonies observed on this occasion were the same as those which the Russian government observes at every installation of a khan. We have already spoken of them.

[264 cont.]

248
643 The election of Vali by Ablai's Kazak subjects and his confirmation by Russia did not prevent another khan from appearing in the same horde. He was chosen by the Naiman descent line and confirmed by the emperor of China. The descendants of the ancient Naimans, who had blended into the mass of the Kazak people of the time, obeyed, at the time of Ablai, Sultan Abulfenz, son of Abul Mahmet and brother of Pulat, the khan of Turkestan. And although he had had some relations with the Orenburg authorities and had even requested a stipend, he was nevertheless a subject of China. He died in 1783, leaving a son named Bupu and a son-in-law, Khan Khodja, son of Barak, whose acquaintance we have already made. One of these princes was to inherit Abulfenz's authority, but each had his partisans, who could not come to an agreement on the choice and who set the entire Naiman descent group in commotion with their quarrels. The majority of the votes were in favor of Khan Khodja, however, so that this prince became the sovereign of the former subjects of Abulfenz, and the troubles were ended. When the emperor of China learned this, he sent him a certificate as khan by one of his high officials. The ministry in Peking considered this a necessary measure because it regarded the entire Middle Horde as subjects of China and because it had named Ablai a Chinese prince. When it was seen that Ablai's son Vali was submitting [642] himself to Russia, he was speedily replaced, for the dignity of the empire, by another Kazak prince who was submissive.

248 With the exception of Vali, the other sons and close kinsmen of Ablai had few relations with Russia. Some of them proudly acknowledged themselves to be subjects of China.

This was the behavior adopted by Sultan Chingis, who [265] marched in 1784 with an army raised in the steppes to put down a revolt which had broken out in Tashkent. Another brother of [64] Khan Vali, Sultan Tyz, who was also devoted to China, is known to us only for his hatred of the Buruts.

248 Tyz was not the only one to attack his bloodthirsty neighbors. [24] Several sections or branches of the Kazaks who lived near the Chinese borders continued to maintain the war against the Buruts

[271 cont.]

x 648 All this was true, but no one paid any attention to it be-
[721] cause no one in Orenburg believed in Nurali's sincerity, and the
[662] new government, being prejudiced against him, believed the
727 re-establishment of peace in the horde to be impossible without
changing its administration, or at least without a new khan.

x 648 Baron Igelstrom's first choice for a new khan was Kaip, son
662 of Sultan Batyr, who had reigned in Khiva and was driven out
for his rapaciousness and cruelty. We have spoken of him several
times, as well as of his father. The central government could
not ignore the acts of hostility committed by this sultan against
the Russians, nor his conduct in Khiva, and therefore his election
was put off until more detailed information could be collected
concerning him (1). And in the end it did not take place (2).

1. Rescript from the Empress to Baron
Igelstrom of November 25, 1785.

2. A similar rescript of November 12, 1786.

Kaip was proposed for this position twice. The first proposal was
brought about by two plans drawn up by Baron Igelstrom, who
had firmly decided to introduce a new form of government in the
Little Horde.

x 648 In one of these plans he proposed to divide the horde into
[621] three sections, according to the number of its descent lines,
[177] namely those of Semirod, Baiulin, and Alimul, and to give each
643 a khan, but to limit the authority of these new chiefs so that they
would bear only an honorary title and be, in effect, only the
executors of the commands of the supreme head of the govern-
ment of Orenburg.

[272] The other plan was to abolish the position of khan in
the Little Horde completely and gradually to apply to them the
[671] code given by Catherine for the administration of guberniyas.

This last thought was drawn from one of the cherished as
well as most remarkable works of the Empress, and thus it was
especially commended and confirmed in St. Petersburg.

[273 cont.]

x 648 privileges which the latter held by birth, Syrym proposed that
646 the position of khan was unnecessary and sought to make up for
728 his own lack of illustrious ancestors by personal merit. Under
his influence the national assembly swore the oath of loyalty to
the empress of Russia without the least opposition, promised to
stop its raids, and to apply its efforts to maintain peace in the
horde and to obey all the commands of the Russian government.
But it demanded as a guarantee of Russia's protection, that
Abulkhair's descendants, including Nurali himself, should forever
lose the right to be khans of the Little Horde.

x 648 Can one fail to recognize Syrym's ambition in this demand?
643 Nurali and his brothers were poor leaders because of their weak-
662 ness, not because of their cruelty. Thus they could not have
incurred the hatred of the entire horde to the point of forcing it
to consider their removal from power as necessary to their peace.
Then the government even went so far as to say that it was no
longer up to it to change the course of affairs, because the idea
of abolishing the position of khan had long since been adopted.
Moreover, the peaceful inclinations of the national assembly and
Syrym's clever actions seemed favorable to the re-establishment
of calm within the horde.

x 648 [274] Actually, the year 1786 stood out among all other
721 years, especially the two preceding, because of the calm which
727 reigned during its span and the more frequent relations between
the Russians and the Kazaks. It is true that there were also
several disturbances springing from the abasement of all the sultans,
especially the descendants of Abulkhair. Nevertheless this does
not prevent our notice of the fact that the greatest exchanges of
[439] livestock (1) on the line took place in 1786 and 1787, and in the

1. See the table on the quantity of
livestock exchanged by the Kazaks with
the Russians from 1745 to 1820 that we
have included in the statistical article
[pp. 426 to 427, not translated].

[275 cont.]

x 648 Baron Igelstrom not only forgot Batyr Syrym's former actions but even took him under his special protection, chose him as the instrument of his operations, maintained a correspondence with him at once, and held conferences with him, as though he were the chargé d'affaires or the representative of the entire national assembly. When the Khan was informed of these details, he wrote [662 152] that Syrym was a knave who was deceiving the government and that he had no thought of re-establishing good order but only considered his own interests. The Khan also said that he attributed his own opinions to the entire assembly and that in his heart he was a sworn enemy of Russia, etc. These accusations were vindicated by time, but coming from the lips of a weak and humiliated sovereign and under circumstances which explicitly belied his accusations, they could not appear true and were accordingly allowed to slip into oblivion. It is true that Nurali added certain unequivocal signs of his devotion to Russia, for at this time he [728] released several Russian prisoners whom he had brought to the horde, offered his children as hostages, and placed himself at the disposal of the government. But he was too late. His personal submission was no longer needed. What was wanted was the force of power or of genius, which alone was capable of acting upon the horde.

x 648 Syrym had already acquired this force by his intelligence, 643 his influence over the people, and by the protection of the border 661 authorities. Thus it appeared that he promised greater advantages than the Khan, who had shown nothing but weakness for 37 years. The fate of this unhappy prince deserves pity. Yet following the opinion he had formed of Nurali and the system which had been adopted, Baron Igelstrom no longer found it possible to keep him in the horde. Thus he asked permission to [276] have the Khan brought into Russia, and once he had been received (1),

1. By a rescript of the Empress of June 3, 1786.

^x449 [276 cont.]

• [443 he was not less quick to profit from it, as he was soon presented
667] with an opportunity to do.

Syrym's followers, as much to please him as to satisfy their
[721] own greediness, did not stop with committing offenses against
579] Nurali in all sorts of ways, but ended by attacking villages and
pillaging everything they found there. Nurali, defenseless,
turned to the power of Russia and requested an armed guard from
the border authorities. When he was refused, he decided to with-
draw to Orenburg for a time in order to save his life, and from
this city he was taken to Ufa, where he died four years later.
His brother Aichuvak was detained during this time in Uralsk.

[152 It is useless to describe the impression which these events
662] gave to Nurali's children and the other descendants of Abulkhair.
The eldest and the best known, because of his intelligence and
valor, was Sultan Erali, who had had frequent relations with
Russia, as we have seen. But six years before he had conquered
the Karakalpaks and lived with them on the Syr [Darya] (2). He

2. Bekehrin, an interpreter of Orenburg,
traveled on the Syr in 1781, and found
Sultan Erali was already sovereign of the
Karakalpaks.

knew perfectly well who was mainly responsible for the mis-
fortunes of his brothers and who had caused them to lose the pro-
tection of Russia, which Abulkhair and his line had had for more
than half a century. Anxious to avenge the grievances of his
[726] family, he resolved to attack Syrym and marched against him
with an army which was few in number but could be counted
upon. Luck smiled upon Sultan Erali on this expedition. He
captured the representative of the national assembly, the title
which Syrym gave himself.

[668 At this same time other tribes of the Little Horde, who
643] were not attached to Abulkhair's family but also did not wish to
follow the incitements of Syrym or of his principal accomplices
and who were accustomed, furthermore, to having khans,

x 648 [277] elevated Kaip, a man of whom we have already spoken, to
668 this position several times. A third part of the horde did not wish to
643 recognize Kaip; but it asserted, as his subjects, that the Kazaks
should have a khan, that their ancestors had found it necessary, and
that they did not wish to set aside a custom which was hallowed by
time. For this reason, they demanded either the return of
Nurali or another khan in his place. During all this time, Syrym
was Erali's prisoner.

x 648 The situation weakened the conviction of the Orenburg head,
177 and Baron Igelstrom, being afraid of allowing the Kazaks to indulge
643 themselves in new disputes, requested the confirmation of Kaip as
khan of the entire Little Horde. The Empress was of an entirely
different opinion. Having once decided to introduce a form of
government in the steppes beyond the Ural River which was in
harmony with that of the interior provinces, she did not wish to
change her plan unless absolutely necessary, and she replied,
with her usual firmness, with an explicit refusal to Baron Igelstrom
on November 12, 1786.

x 648 Without entering into the good or the evil which could be
produced by the authority of a khan among the Kazaks, we will
only say that after all the proclamations made to the Little Horde
in 1785 and 1786, Nurali's exile in Russia, and many other
measures taken in order to introduce a new form of government
among the Kazaks, Catherine could not give up a plan which had
scarcely been tried without injury to her dignity. Consequently
her reply was much more in accord with the dignity of the empire
than was the proposal of the governor of Orenburg.

Besides, even if the Empress had consented to the restora-
tion of the position of khan, she would not have preferred Kaip to
the other sultans who had far more rights than he. Several circum-
stances were opposed to the accomplishment of his ambitious ideas.

[579] First, a report was even made to Orenburg of the fact that while
he was living on the Syr [Darya] after his expulsion from Khiva,
[278] he had often pillaged caravans and had expressed an open
[177] [643] hatred for Russia (1). Second, there was another obstacle in the

1. See Baron Igelstrom's reports of
September 23 and October 15, 1786.

[278 cont.]

²⁴³ promise given to Abulkhair by Empress Anna to choose khans
¹⁷⁷ only from among his successors. Third, Nurali had on his side
⁶⁴³ not only his kinsmen but also the most powerful princes of the
Middle Horde, the most important of whom was Sultan Khudai
Mendi, a man as distinguished for his intelligence as for the
large number of his followers and the authority he had acquired
over them.

²⁴⁸ Vali Khan took a great interest in Nurali's fate and argued
⁶⁶⁴ vigorously with the Russian government (2) on his behalf, and he

2. See Baron Igelstrom's report of
December 18, 1786.

also wrote the same thing and warmly defended the descendants
of Abulkhair, whom he called the father of all the Kazak khans
subject to Russia and the first creator of the submission of the
Little Horde (3). Finally, in 1787 a large part of the national

3. See another of Baron Igelstrom's
reports, that of September 29, 1787.

assembly expressed the desire to see Nurali returned to the horde,
out of respect for Abulkhair, who was considered a saint by many
Kazaks. All these circumstances spoke in Nurali's favor, but
they did not promise peace among the Kazaks in the future.
Therefore, the execution of the latest intentions of the Russian
government, to introduce in the Little Horde an organization
conforming to that of the interior guberniyas continued unabated.

²⁴⁸ Meanwhile Batyr Syrym regained his freedom and once again
⁶⁶² began to influence the people in accord with the plans of the
¹⁷⁷ Orenburg authorities, which he seconded as long as they were not
contrary to his own views. Under the guise of devotion to Russia
and gratitude to the local authority which had chosen him as its
instrument, Syrym helped Baron Igelstrom greatly in the reforms
which he made in the Little Horde in 1787, which we are about
to describe.

[279 cont.]

X⁶⁴⁸

After this beginning Baron Igelstrom, who felt, on the basis of Syrym's assurances, that the establishment of peace in the Little Horde was inevitable, [280] prepared to build cities, mosques, caravansaries, and schools in the middle of the steppes.

[17]

He reported this to the Empress and planned to comply in everything with the organization of the provinces of the interior and to the regulations published in Russia on public education.

[18]

This gratifying and consoling hope did not last long. By the following year, 1788, it was beginning to weaken, and soon it disappeared completely. The people, who had long been

[662
578]

accustomed to excitement and brigandage, tired of their inactivity and once more began their old disputes, driven from one side by Nurali's kinsmen, from another by Kaip, and from a third by Batyr Syrym. The followers of the latter were the most numerous and the most active. The sultans could have no power over them, as they were no longer respected. The elders chosen to supervise the conduct of the people, as well as the heads of the tribunals, had no authority and dared not give commands, and followed the stream which carried them along.

[92]

[721
662]

These internal circumstances were joined by others which acted from outside. The Turks, then at war with Russia, sought to incite the Bukharans against the Russians. The Bukharans aroused the Little Horde, and it was to this end that they suggested to Erali, at first, that they help him take back Khan Nurali by force. Later they entered into relations with Syrym and sent him and those of his line an appeal couched in these terms:

X⁶⁴⁸

721

771

186

662

"To the brave warriors, beys, and elders, Sarytai bey, Syrym Batyr, Shukurali bey, Sadyrbek, Barak Batyr, Dajdan Batyr, peace and blessing. And now our words. Glory to the most high God! By His holy grace, all our affairs are running smoothly. We have but one sorrow. Not long ago an ambassador came to us from the Turkish sovereign, vicar of God, with a letter informing us that the infidel Russians have assembled from all sides and, in alliance with the seven Christian states, have started to march. [281] Since you live closer to the Russians than we do and, consequently, know better how to fight them, we propose

X⁶⁴⁸ [282 cont.]

[721] "In closing, we are respectfully, in the year of the Hegira
[771] 1202 (1788 after the birth of Jesus Christ)."

[186] To this letter was affixed the black seal of the atalyk of
[662] Bukhara (first minister of Shah Murat).

[721] Syrym, in spite of his ties with the Orenburg authorities,
[662] replied to the atalyk that he himself and his followers were ready to obey the commandments of God, but that they could not begin the war until the Bukharans and the other Asiatic peoples had entered Russia.

This step came to the knowledge of the Russian government, and Syrym began to be suspected and his duplicity discovered, and all confidence in him was lost. On his part, he did not wish to suffer humiliation, and although he still seemed devoted for a certain time, at the same time he no longer seemed so disposed to agree with the views of the Orenburg government. Meanwhile his followers were again pillaging Russia as before. The raids on the borders increased daily. The disputes became much stronger in the horde. While the sultans and part of the people demanded a khan, the elders charged with supervising the conduct of the people, as well as the members of the tribunals, did not carry out anything, never met, did not look into matters, did not come to Orenburg except to collect their stipends, and had no influence over the horde.

● [643] In this state of affairs there was no longer anything else to do but to return to the old administration and to re-establish the position of khan. An auspicious pretext was offered for this re-establishment when Nurali, at his death, commanded, among his last wishes to his children, that they remain faithful to Russia.

[283] The Russian government's sole desire to designate a new khan for the Little Horde was a bolt of lightning to Syrym and stripped off the mask with which he had covered himself. When he saw his most cherished hopes destroyed and had lost all his importance, he no longer had the will or the need to restrain himself. For this reason he returned to his early pursuits and once more openly began to act as a brigand.

[284 cont.]

x 648 successful, because the sultans, and especially the descendants of
646 Abulkhair, were trying to please the Russian government, having
721 been informed of the Empress' intentions to re-establish the post
of khan among them. As for individual raids, Syrym's followers
continued them almost without interruption for seven or eight years.

648 The main raids took place after the election of Sultan Erali
[726] to the position of khan, which was in 1791 by order of the Empress.
When she learned of Nurali's death, she commanded on January 29
that Erali be named his successor and that he be sent the patent of
[643] khan of the Little Horde without waiting for any representations.
In carrying out the will of his sovereign, the commander of the
province of Orenburg at once informed Abulkhair's son of the
honor which was being given him and invited him to appear at
the border at the end of summer to receive the ceremonial investiture.
Erali arrived at the Ural at the designated time with his
followers and on September 4 was proclaimed khan, 15 versts from
the fortress of Orsk.

This is how his election took place. On the day at the hour
designated, Lieutenant General Peutling, supreme commander of
[285] the border region of Orenburg, escorted by a body of troops
appeared before the assembled Kazaks and commanded first of all
that the imperial document be read to them, in which it was said
that Erali had been designated khan, both because of his personal
merit and because he was the eldest in Abulkhair's family. Then
he invited the people to proceed to the election according to its
old customs.

At this same moment there appeared the deputies of Batyr
Syrym, those of Sultan Abulgazy Kaip, and those of several elders,
who announced that they did not consent to the election of Erali.
They received the reply that he had been designated by the wish
of the Empress. The next day, after the proclamation of the
Khan, that is, September 5, six deputies were chosen who were
sent to St. Petersburg to ask that he be confirmed.

On September 6 a letter was received from the khan of
Turkestan, Pirali, son of Nurali, in which this prince, who had

[287 cont.]

748 This khan could not distinguish himself in such a short time and under such harassing circumstances. Yet his mind and his inclinations to support the Russian government in its views could have made him truly of service to his people.

• [643] When the news of his death was received in St. Petersburg, the Empress commanded that inquiries be made among the Kazaks concerning whom they wished to have as khan and especially to find out their attitudes toward Sultan Ishim, eldest son of Nurali.

[54] The latter had long been known for his attachment to Russia and was deserving, both for his personal qualities and the respect of the people, of inheriting the rank which had belonged to his father, his grandfather, and his most distant ancestors.

[63] Events served to lend greater force to his rights. The Little Horde was divided into two factions, the first under the name of Sultan Abulgazi, being obedient to Syrym, his ally and his rival, and the second ruled by Ishim. Russia could not count upon the first, for she had already had to suffer much mischief from it, and could still expect only hostile acts on its part. The second group included the sultans and elders who were most attached to Russia, and thus she could not act otherwise than to prefer it and to give privileges to its leader.

[63] [288] It must be noted, however, that even this group of the horde did not wish to choose Ishim as khan except under certain conditions. They asked that he become an independent sovereign (autocrat), that he not recognize the suzerainty of Russia, and that to this end he should withdraw into the interior of the steppes toward the Syr Darya. Ishim, who was accustomed to basing all his hopes on the protection of the Russian rulers, informed the Orenburg authorities of the demands of his people himself, adding that Syrym's followers were not only preventing him from trying to find the bandits and pursue them, but were also exacting from him a kun /blood price/, or payment of 2,000 sheep, for having sent to Orenburg shortly before two Kazaks who were famous for their banditry. Ishim's frankness and his promise not to go away from the Russian border led the government to use all its efforts to cause him to be elected khan. In mid-September of

[288 cont.]

X 648 1795, his partisans assembled by invitation near Orenburg, and on
[643] September 17 he was elected and proclaimed khan. They then
swore on the Koran to live in peace with each other and not to
disturb the Russian border.

X 648 681 Ishim's elevation did not diminish his attachment to the
power which had given him a new title. After he became khan
he did not cease to carry out the wishes of the Russian government
as much as possible, against the wishes of his people, and this
caused him to have many enemies. In order to avert the dangers
which threatened him because of the severity with which he
investigated the crimes as well the intrigues of Syrym and his
followers, Empress Catherine decided to send him a detachment
of troops to guard him and at the same time to help him carry out
sentences against the offenders.

X 648 645 It was also decided to establish a divan or council of the
khan around him to support him in the administration of the Little
Horde. The members of this divan, chosen by the people from
among the most distinguished sultans and elders, were to carry out
the wishes of the Khan, to help him, to represent him, and to [289]
live with him in houses which were ordered to be built for them in
the steppes in the territory of Taissugan.

X 648 [669] These plans could not be carried out because Syrym Batyr at-
tacked Ishim in November, 1797 near the fortified post of
Krasny Yar [Krasnoiar] and, after causing him to perish cruelly,
pillaged all his belongings.

This crime of Syrym's exhausted the patience of the govern-
ment, but how and where was he to be punished, much less brought
into Russia? No doubt it was possible to send troops against him, but
the difficulty of looking for him, the maintenance of the troops
beyond the borders, the loss of men from hunger and thirst, even
the destruction of Syrym's followers still did not assure the success
of the pursuit they might undertake. Thus we should not be
astonished that this famous brigand evaded punishment for all his
attacks against Russia.

[726] However, all the Kazaks who followed his example and
pillaged the borders at that time did not remain without punishment.

[289 cont.]

X 648 [726] During the winter of 1797-98, a strong detachment of Ural Cossacks crossed the Ural River and not only defeated the robbers but in exchange for the studs which had been taken from them in Russia, [727] they carried off several thousands of horses, which were distributed to those who had suffered losses. Shortly afterward they were attacked by the Bashkirs, who took 5,000 horses from them.

It can be imagined that the Kazaks did not leave these two losses unavenged. The result was new raids, new reprisals, and new insults from one side and the other. In order to put an end to these disturbances, commissions were established on the borders composed of deputies of the Bashkir, Kazak, and Kalmuk peoples, as well as the Ural and Orenburg Cossacks. These commissions were supposed to examine the complaints which came to them from all sides and to satisfy them as much as possible, as well as to try to suppress permanently demands which were unjust or impossible to satisfy.

[290] These commissions did not fulfill the object of their meeting, and indeed scarcely set about satisfying the duties imposed on them, for no one appeared at the tribunal.

[67] At this time many Kazaks from different hordes asked to establish themselves permanently in Russia. Their requests were answered in an ukase of September 30, 1797, as a consequence of which 12,000 tents of the Middle Horde alone are settled down in various localities to this day.

[646] After Ishim's death the government of the Little Horde was entrusted to a council composed of Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair, as president, and six councilors, two from each tribe. They were all chosen by Baron Igelstrom, who was then commanding the Orenburg border area for the second time and had once again given the government the idea of maintaining the Kazaks without the intermediary of a khan. When Emperor Paul had sent a confirmation of his demands, he chose the Khobda River as the permanent residence of the council and had it opened in this region by the mufti Mohammed Djan Hussein, who was sent from Orenburg in 1797. The councilors took an oath of loyalty and swore to carry out their duties zealously, and the mufti remained with them

[290 cont.]

^{x648} for some time to observe their conduct. His supervision soon became useless, because the nomads did not wish to have a council, did not turn to it in their affairs, and asked for a khan.

^{x648} In order to comply with their wishes, that same year it was ordered to proceed with the election of a successor to Ishim.

⁶⁴³ Most of the horde wanted to elect Sultan Karatai, son of Nurali, but his devotion to Russia was doubtful. Sultan Aichuvak, son of Abulkhair and uncle of Karatai, who had presided over the council, inspired much more confidence in the government and had much more right to this honor. In October, 1797 the Kazaks assembled near the [291] border proclaimed him, and the following year Emperor Paul confirmed him, as the chief of the entire Little Horde. The council which had been formed to govern the Little Horde after Ishim's death was ordered to remain constantly by Khan Aichuvak and was called the council of the khan.

^{x648} It can be seen by the Orenburg archives that Aichuvak had often distinguished himself, not only by his attachment to Russia but also by his influence over the Kazaks while they were ruled by Nurali. Thus his elevation to the rank of khan seemed to promise various advantages. However, what followed did not justify this hope. Being burdened with age, the Khan could not act as he had earlier and was nothing more than a very weak leader.

^[579] The internal disputes, the Buruts, the pillaging of caravans, the raids on the Russian frontier, especially against the Bashkirs, the acts of vengeance which were taken after these, the investigations

^[643] and the punishments caused a terrible confusion in the Little Horde. The commissions formed of deputies from the different peoples, which we described above, could not act, and it was decided to dissolve them. The Khan did not have enough power to punish the guilty or to protect the oppressed. The disorder and anarchy which had more or less always prevailed among the Kazaks increased from one day to the next, and finally the dissensions spread everywhere.

^[649] These circumstances produced very important consequences. Many of the Kazaks who were nomadizing near the Ural River withdrew to the far end of the steppes and refused to obey the descendants of Abulkhair. Some of them fused with several

[291 cont.]

x 248
[69] descent lines of the Middle Horde and chose to live much farther
[164] to the east than the former. Others withdrew to the mouth of the
[727] Syr[Darya], and after overthrowing the Karakalpaks, they chose
Sultan Abulgazi Kaip as khan.

A third group attacked the Turkmen, and after forcing them to give up part of their lands, they occupied a large part of the isthmus which separates the Aral Sea from the Caspian Sea. Aichuvak himself and several sultans with [292] him were obliged to cross the Ural River to save their lives and to remain in Russia until this general fermentation was calmed.

● [643] Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, who had had the place of
[646] president in the council of the khan, did the same, but he
[167] followed a different course. He lived near the border of the
government of Astrakhan, and knowing that after the departure of the Kalmuks, many lands had remained deserted which were suitable for pasturage, he decided in 1799 to leave forever the steppes beyond the Ural River and to go over into the territory called Ryn Peski. Having decided thus and hoping to become an independent khan soon, Bukei addressed himself to General Knorring, the governor general of Georgia and Astrakhan, begging for permission to occupy the lands he had chosen between the Ural and the Volga and the freedom to transport there the Kazaks in his auls, while assigning him 100 Cossacks with their officers in order to maintain order.

It was impossible to neglect a proposal which was so advantageous and so useful. Governor Knorring brought it to the attention of Emperor Paul, who, by an ukase of March 11, 1801, commanded that it be put into execution.

[619] Without losing time, Bukei prepared to move into Russia
[167] about the autumn of that same year. The Kazaks who followed him belonged mostly to the Baiulin descent line. There were few of the Alimul line and almost none from that of the Semirod. All of them together comprised about 10,000 tents. Once they had occupied the Ryn Peski, they promptly became a clear and striking demonstration of the effects of a peaceful life. While their compatriots beyond the Ural River, ruined and exhausted by their

[292 cont.]

648 dissensions, came to sell their children in Russian villages, Bukey's
 511 subjects not only remained peaceful but also became rich to the
 127 point that their herds and studs increased almost tenfold in the
 course of seven or eight years. It seemed that [293] such an attractive
 example for every nomadic people should have inspired
 181 the Kazaks to follow it, but their love for their savage freedom
 and their homeland was more powerful than any example.

It is time to return to the history of the Middle Horde, which we interrupted at the moment when Vali, son of Ablai, became khan. Our silence concerning this part of the Kazak people has been due, first, to the uninterrupted continuation of the events which took place in the Little Horde during the last 20 years of the last century, second, to the monotonous calm in the Middle Horde during this period, and third, to the fact that this very calm makes the external relations of the horde with Russia, as well as the events which took place within the horde, unremarkable.

The statement of these reasons no doubt causes every reader to wonder why the Middle Horde enjoyed and still enjoys today more tranquillity than the Little Horde, even though the two hordes are composed of one and the same people. In our opinion two circumstances have produced this difference: the situation of the lands occupied by the two hordes, and the difference in ways, partly arising from this geographical position and partly from other causes. We shall explain ourselves in greater detail.

101 The Little Horde has its compatriots for neighbors only to the east. In the south it is often attacked by the Khivans, in the
 127 north it has the Bashkirs, its irreconcilable enemies, and in the west it has suffered much in the past from the Ural Cossacks. Thus, having had to sustain violent attacks from all sides, it has not been able to remain at peace for long and has grown accustomed to disturbances and to raids into neighboring territories. In addition,
 643 the khans are always distinguished for their weakness. The Middle Horde, on the contrary, occupies the lands which have
 101 the Little Horde to the west. To the east it has its compatriots of the Great Horde and the establishments of the Chinese border. In the north is the [294] Siberian line, whose inhabitants are

[294 cont.]

²⁴³very peaceful. To the south there is once again the Great Horde, [101] or the subjects of what is now the khanate of Kokand, including the people of Tashkent, Turkestan, etc., who are little accustomed [121] to war and little inclined to make raids upon the Kazak peoples. With these neighbors, the Middle Horde was exposed only to the attacks of the Bashkirs, who bordered it on the side of the fort of Troitsk, and to those of the Buruts in the south. But the extent to which these peoples could do damage was so small compared to the expanse of its lands, that one must admit the advantages of its geographical position over that of the Little Horde and to conclude therefore that it was much less troubled than the latter from the outside.

[721] Having clarified our first thought, we believe it is also [181] very simple to explain the second. For there is no doubt that a people which is less often obliged to defend itself against outside attack and less frequently prompted to wreak vengeance acquires milder habits than a people which is always doing battle with its enemies. We will note, in addition, that the khans and sultans • [643] of the Middle Horde always had more power and influence over their subjects than those of the Little Horde. In this connection the long administration of Ablai, first as sultan and later as khan, was particularly useful.

[181] The Kazaks who followed Ablai became accustomed under [643] him to peace and the obedience which one can expect from a half-savage people, and they remained peaceful under his son Vali, although his khan did not have his father's talent for gaining the general respect. On the other hand, however, he made a show of never seeking the protection of Russia, paid no attention to the demands of the authorities of the Siberian borders, refused to surrender the Turkmen who had fled with the Kalmuks from the government of Astrakhan and who were later held by Ablai, and finally he persecuted the elders who were devoted to Russia. In [161] 1789 a large number of people who were considered [295] his [311] subjects crossed over into Russia with Tugum, sultan of the Great Horde, in order to establish themselves permanently there, and they received lands near the fort of Ust-Kamenogorsk for their settlement.

[295 cont.]

X 648

In 1793, Lieutenant General Strandman, commandant of the Siberian line, sent a body of troops into the Kazak steppes which liberated the Turkmen prisoners. Vali was so distressed at this loss that he complained to the Empress. The only satisfaction he received was the permission to come to St. Petersburg to explain all his needs and his requests, and he did not take advantage of this because he was afraid to leave the horde. Finally, after the death of his brother Chingis, he announced that all his complaints [62] had been made on the advice of his brother, and he reconciled himself with the local authorities and promised to help them in all matters.

● [643] 661

This move, however, was not a proof of perfect devotion to Russia, for he wished to maintain his relations with China, following the example of his father, and to this end he sent his son to the emperor of China in the winter of 1794-95 to bear witness to his submission. At the same time he continued to oppress the tribal chiefs, except those who were attached to Russia. The result of this behavior was that in January, 1795 two sultans, 19 elders, 43,360 of their subjects and 79,000 other Kazaks submitted a petition to the Empress asking to be delivered from Vali's rule and to be accepted under the direct dominion of the Russian government.

The execution of this demand was too difficult and promised no advantage to Russia. In the meantime Vali showed signs of repentance and raised the hope that he would become reconciled with the malcontents, and therefore things remained in their original state.

[619]

The part of the horde which lived along the Verkhne-Uralsk line and had the Bashkirs for neighbors, as we said above, in 1795 gave the most [296] convincing proof of the truth of our reflections about the causes which made the Middle Horde more peaceful than the Little Horde. At the time when the tribes and divisions of the [39] 721 Kazaks along the border were peacefully carrying on trade with the Russians on the Siberian line, it made several raids in the districts [72] of Chelyabinsk and Verkhne-Uralsk, laid waste several villages then, took many prisoners, and carried off quite a large number of

[296 cont.]

248 studs, to avenge themselves for the thefts and offenses committed
[72] against them by the Bashkirs. Finally, this group decided to withdraw into the depths of their steppes and did not agree to come near the Russian borders except on the invitation of General Viazmitinov, the commander in chief of the Orenburg region.

[92] In 1798 it was ordered that a tribunal be established, after the example of the Little Horde and on the request of Khan Vali, in the fort of Petropavlovsk, for the judgment of suits and disputes between the Kazaks of the Middle Horde and the residents along the Siberian border. This tribunal, made up of deputies of these two peoples, was organized in 1800, but the Kazak members let several years pass without appearing, so that it was not opened until 1806.

Here we end the detailed description of the Kazak hordes.
[14] Having shown everything which took place among these peoples until the end of the 18th century, we will not speak of the events of the 19th century. The time which has passed since its beginning is still too close to us, and the judgments we could bring to this period would seem either partial, or misplaced, or doubtful.

We consider it necessary, however, to mark the transition between the past and the present by indicating briefly the order of succession of the khans of the Middle Horde and the Little Horde of the Kazaks.

• [43] Vali, who succeeded his father in 1781, reigned until his
579 death, which came in 1818. However in his last years he was not the sole khan of the Middle Horde, for because of [297] his quarrels with several tribal chiefs and at the request of several Kazaks, in 1816 Emperor Alexander designated a second khan for this horde, who was Bukei, son of Barak, and who died in 1818.

• [31] With him the title of khan died out in the Middle Horde. Today it is divided into districts and governed by a special regulation which we will enter at the end of this work. [This section not translated.]

[43] Aichuvak ruled the Little Horde until 1805 and then abdicated of his own accord because of old age and illness.

His successor was his son Djantiura, who was assassinated by his cousins, the sons of Khan Nurali, and their accomplices.

[297 cont.]

448

643

After his death the Little Horde was without a khan for more than two years. In 1812 his brother Shirgazy, who is still alive [1832], was elevated to that position, but he no longer rules the horde, because it too has been divided by the government into [631] three districts, whose chiefs are independent of the khan.

643

At the same time as the elevation of Shirgazy, that is, in 1812, Sultan Bukei, son of Nurali, was appointed the khan of the Kazaks who had come with him from the left bank of the Ural into the government of Astrakhan and had since then been given the name of the Bukei Horde.

Bukei died in 1815, leaving several sons, of whom the eldest, Dhangir, was appointed khan in 1824. He is still governing the Kazaks who live in the government of Astrakhan.

This is the end of the list of the Kazak khans who have been recognized and confirmed by the Russian government. We do not include among them Barak, or Batyr, or Kaip, or his son Abulgazy, for, as we have said previously, they were not elected except by a small number of their partisans. The last, in spite of his title, was according to eyewitnesses (1), almost reduced

1. See the memoirs of Dr. Bolshoi, who was taken prisoner by the Kazaks in 1803.

578

[298] to a state of mendicancy. His power and influence over the people was so weak after Batyr Syrym, that we would not even have mentioned him if he himself, his brothers and his children, among whom Sultan Arungazi must be particularly distinguished, did not continue to stand out for their hereditary hatred of Abulkhair's descent line. We have followed the constant progress of this mutual hatred between the two families for a whole century. Our readers know that it already existed between Abulkhair and Kaip at the beginning of the last century.

It passed from them to their children, and to their grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, among whom it still continues today and who will carefully transmit it to their descendants, perhaps for another century or even more.

[300 cont.]

161 divisions of these hordes into several parts, he will be fully convinced that an exact census of this people is absolutely impossible.

Thus it is necessary to be content with information, no doubt quite uncertain, which they themselves have transmitted to the

162 Russians and which is far from resting on adequate data. The result of this is that the three hordes are composed of approximately 400,000 tents or families, and that of this number, the Great Horde has about 75,000, the Middle Horde 165,000, and the Little Horde 160,000 (1).

161 1. Since the beginning of the 14th /19th?/ century, the Little Horde has suffered considerable losses in men, as much through internal dissensions as through misunderstandings with their neighbors.

The number of individuals living in each tent is not always the same, but there is good ground for believing that the truth will not be distorted in carrying it to five or six, on the average. Consequently, the Great Horde would have 375,000 to 450,000 persons, the Middle Horde about 1,000,000, and the Little Horde about 900,000, while the three together would make up from 2,000,000 to 2,400,000 persons of both sexes.

Chapter II. Division of the People.

631 No matter what differences in origin are attributed to the tribes which make up the nation of the Kazaks, they have all been fused into a single people living in the same country, which [301] in olden times was subject to a single chief. The proof of this is in the language, the religion, the customs, and the habits, which are everywhere the same.

173 643 The traditions confirm this, adding further that at the death of one of their khans, who had reigned over the entire nation, his three sons divided it among themselves, and that according to the order of birth of their respective chiefs, these three divisions

[301 cont.]

643 adopted the names of the Great (1), the Middle, and the Little
173

1. The other hordes regard the Great
Horde as the oldest.

161 Horde. Tradition also has it that the difference in population of
631 the groups was caused by war and varying success, and as the
divisions gradually increased, each one divided into several descent
lines which took the names of their chiefs or kept the names of
their ancient ancestors, such as the Naimans, the Kipchaks, etc.
The descent lines were subdivided in turn into tribes, and the
latter into sections, the sections into branches, and the branches
into parts. It is almost impossible to enumerate all these sub-
divisions. The work necessary (2) for such an enterprise would

[115]

2. What zeal and love for genealogy
one would need to have to decide to verify
and examine the reports of the Kazaks!
One says that his tribe is divided into five
or six sections. Another asserts that it is
divided into twelve. A [302] third confuses
the sections of his tribe with those of the
neighboring tribes. Finally, a fourth, who
is more honest than any of the others, frankly
admits his ignorance.

require too much patience and, above all, a long sojourn among
the Kazaks, not only in every tribe or section, but also in every
part of a section.

621 Thus we will limit ourselves to enumerating the descent
631 lines and the tribes, beginning with the Little Horde, as the
611 closest to Europe. We base ourselves on Tevkelev's memoirs
[114] written more than a century ago. (See the historical section
[not translated]). In the opinion of the Kazaks themselves, the
information contained in these memoirs is worthy of the greatest
confidence, both by their precision and by the circumstances under
which they were written.

[303 cont.]

The Great Horde

631 The Great Horde originally was composed of the Uisiun or
619 Usiun, Tulatai, and Sargam descent lines. Later the Konrat or
611 Kunrat descent line detached itself from the Middle Horde and
joined the Great Horde.

From these first descent lines the following tribes issued:
Botboi, Chimir, Djanis or Yanysh, Sik-Am, Abdai-Suvank, [304]
Sary-Suly, Chanych-Kily, Kanly or Kankly, Djalair, etc.

II. The Konkhrat descent line formed the following tribes:
Bailar-Djandjar, Uras-Geldy, Kuldjegach, Bochman, Tok-Bulat,
Yaman-Bai, Kura-Kusia, Etimlier, Kuyush-Kansyz.

Each of the tribes is divided into sections. A section is
composed of parts, and the latter also have their subdivisions,
and all have different names. For example, the Maskar tribe
of the Baiuly (in the Little Horde) descent line has two sections,
namely: Kutlu-Gadam and Massak. The Kutlu-Gadam section is
made up of two parts called Kurman and Baba-Nasar. The
Kurman part has three subdivisions, which are Atamkan, Umier,
and Kudaigul. The Baba-Nazar part has two subdivisions: Abdu-
Shokur and Djidik.

561
178 What a volume the names of all these subdivisions for the
three hordes would make! Without wearying the reader with such
an enumeration, it will suffice to say that the increase of popula-
tion among the Kazaks is constantly giving rise to new subdivisions,
and that the original names of the descent lines will end up by
being lost. In this manner, the Baiuly and Alimuly have ceased to
bear their generic name of Alchin. It also develops from this that
there are Kazaks who do not know what descent line they belong
to and know only the name of their tribe and their section.

It can be concluded that in a hundred years most of the
names of the Kazak branches which we have cited will no longer
exist except in the Russian archives and in the memory of a few
old men.

565 In addition, these subdivisions concern only the common
611 people. The upper class has another genealogy. This is why
643 the Kazaks divide themselves into two estates, the White bone

[304 cont.]

565 and the Black bone. The White bone is made up only of khans and
611 their descendants, who have the title of sultans. /305/ Zealous
● 643 Moslems also put in this class the khojas, or descendants of saints
[792] in the Moslem chronicle of saints (1). The name of Black bone

[114]

1. Timkovskii, in his Journey to Peking, gives approximately the same meaning to the word khoja. Klaproth, in his notes to the French translation of this work, opposes Timkovskii's opinion. As for me, I repeat what I have heard many times from Kazak lips.

is used not only for the common people but also for the elders and other chiefs who do not have a hereditary position.

According to this distinction, one says "here is a sultan of the pure white bone," because he is descended from a khan in both the male and female line, and "this man is of mixed white bone," because his mother is of common descent.

[554]

Thus one finds among the Kazaks the hereditary distinctions to which so much value is attached in Europe. Savages know how to take pride in services rendered by others, as we do, and to claim privileges as a recompense for the merit of their ancestors.

565
567

We do not place the Telenguts, or servants of the khans (2),


[728]

2. The Telenguts are of Mongol origin but were subjugated by the Kazaks and have adopted the language of their masters. See on this subject, Klaproth's note in his Magasin Asiatique, vol. I, p. 19.

in a special class, nor the kuls, or slaves. The former are accepted among the people and enjoy the same rights, while the latter are considered as chattel or merchandise and are not Kazaks. These are the Russian, Persian, Kalmuk, and other prisoners.

Chart I

Genealogy of the First and Main Branch of the Kirghiz-Kazak Khans
(The earliest founders of the descent groups are two brothers)



Note: The circles with double lines are for the khans and sultans who were still living in 1748, the time at which these charts were made up.

Chart II

Genealogy of the Second Branch of Khans




Chart III


Genealogy of the Third Branch of Khans

Vali
Ablai
Vali
Ablai Khan

The last was still khan in 1748

Note: Those whose names are underlined were still living in 1748.

Supplement to Chart I Prepared in 1824
Khan Abulkhair's Descendants



Note: All these khans governed the Middle Horde. No mention is made here of the sultans who are sons or grandsons of Abulkhair. They are so numerous that a list of their names would unnecessarily weary the readers.

/143 cont. /

101 After the death of Abulkhair in the third quarter of the
195 15th century, the customary struggle for power among the
Genghisides grew stronger in his ulus. The nomads, who had
always felt the animosity of their rulers, found it impossible
to remain in the Uzbek Horde. Most of the Kypchak joined
619 the alliance of the Kirghiz-Kazak, increasing its number to
195 200,000. Under Kasym-khan (who died in the first quarter
643 of the 16th century), the son of Djanybek, the alliance of the
648 Kirghiz-Kazak, which added to itself /144/ the nomadic



A Kirghiz /Kazak/ cemetery of the Adoev /or Aday/ clan
in Kara-Chungul.

195 peoples of the eastern half of the Chagatay ulus, numbered over
643 a million persons. Kasym-khan, who united all the Kirghiz
648 /Kazak/ people, had enormous military power at his disposal.
619 Fortunately for his subjects, this last of the mighty khans was not
numbered among the usual conquerors of Asia, and he acquired the
love of his people by a policy of peace. When averting a proposal
to make war, Kasym-khan said that "the Kazak, as a nomadic
people, should think about winter camps and not about war." Kasym-
195 kahn enjoyed unusual popularity among the people for his love of
643 peace. After the death of Kasym-khan, the Kirghiz-Kazak alliance

175 /144 cont. / After the death
 643 of Kasym-khan, the Kirghiz-Kazak alliance
 631 broke up into smaller units. Each of its sultans tried to seize power, and the dissensions among them led to the ruin of the Kirghiz-Kazak alliance. Later, 200 years after the death of Kasym-khan, the unifier of the Kirghiz-Kazak, his people again appeared on the scene of history in the form of three political unions, known by the names of Elder, Middle, and Younger Hordes. (1).

[101]

1. We consider it necessary to note that that the current names of the hordes as Great and Little characterize the hordes wholly incorrectly and also render the sense of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ words unfaithfully. Uly means elder, ancient, and not great in the sense of quantity (especially as this horde is smaller in number than the others). Kshi does not mean little (in sense of quantity), but younger.

448
 175
 619
 631
 614
 [101]

In the first quarter of the 18th century "there arose the designations of: the southeastern Kazak clans of the Dulat and Kangly as the Elder (uly) Horde, being the most ancient Turkic tribes occupying the lands of the Kazak alliance; the Kypchak, Argyn, Naiman, and Kerei as the Middle (orta) Horde, being the later comers; and the tribe of the Alchin and the clans separated from the tribes of the horde as the Younger (kshi) Horde" (Aristov). At this time all three hordes, who had been pushed from their southeastern lands by the Kalmyk, were wandering in the basins of the Ishim, Nura, and Sary-Su rivers. In 1723 the Dzungarian ruler, Galdan-Tsyren, conquered the clans of the Elder and Middle Hordes. The invasion by the Dzungarians and the Kalmyk forced the Kirghiz /Kazak/ hordes to move west to the Aral and Caspian seas and north to the upper courses of the Ishim, Ural and Tobol rivers. The Younger and Middle

175 /144 cont. / The Younger and Middle
 648 Hordes, pushed by their enemies from the south to the so-
 619 called Gor'kaya line, were obliged to recognize Russian sov-
 631 ereignty. The relations of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ to their sultans and
 khans were free. They recognized their authority as long as
 their interests coincided with the views of the autonomously
 ruling clans. In 1730, Sultan Abulkhair of the Younger Horde
 asked the Russian government to accept his people as subjects.
 He did this partly because he feared an invasion of his lands
 by Galdan-Tsyren, and partly with the intention of strengthen-
 ing his power, which was tottering because of the enmity be-
 tween the sultans. In the 18th century the sultans Ablai /or
 Ablay/, AbulMambet and Barak of the Elder and Middle hordes
 became the rulers of the people by utilizing their good will.
 Ablai, the most popular of the khans named by the Kirghiz
 /Kazak/, carefully avoided subjecting the Kirghiz /Kazak/
 to a foreign power. Some of the clans of the Middle Horde
 accepted Russian sovereignty under the son of Khan Ablai in
 1782, and under Bukel /or Bukey/ Khan, the son of Barak, at
 the end of the 18th century. Certain clans of the Elder Horde
 accepted Russian sovereignty in the 19th century in the person
 of their sultan Syuk-Ablaikhanov. Later, by the third quarter
 of this century all the Kirghiz /Kazak/ clans had gradually
 recognized Russian rule except the Naiman and Kerei. /145/
 These, after the annihilation of the Dzungarian kingdom by
 the Chinese in the third quarter of the 18th century left the present
 Akmolinsk oblast to go to their old lands on the Tarbagatai
 and Black Irtysh, and from there into China.

175 The Kirghiz /Kazak/, who had never known a sovereign
 648 power, which would have been unfeasible in the free steppe,
 where from time immemorial the traditional form of power had
 been concentrated in the hands of an autonomously ruling clan
 and its leaders, became part of the population of the steppe
 oblasts in the 19th century. Although they had acknowledged
 their dependence on the Russian government, the Kirghiz
 /Kazak/ did not reconcile themselves to this position at once,
 and even attempted to reestablish their independence later.

565 descent which unite the Kazakhs as a people also divide them into aristocrat and commoner, noble and subject. There are three identifiable social classes, aristocrats, commoners, and slaves. (The slaves are an important class in traditional Kazakh society, but are not central to the discussion here.) At some point in history, the senior descent line segregated itself from the other lines and achieved aristocratic status. The head of the senior family of the senior descent line is the Khan of all the Kazakhs—so goes the theory of Kazakh kinship and social organization.

• C43
602
[565] These aristocratic descent lines formed the ruling strata of the hordes, the clans, and of all Kazakhdom when they were united. From their ranks came the khans and lesser leaders (sultans, begs, and clan chiefs) by right of first-born descent. Hordes were ruled by descent lines, clans by aristocratic lineages.

The supreme ruler of the Kazakhs, when there was one, bore the title of Khan. Sultans in Central Asia are of lower rank, the equivalent of princes. The Kazakh domain, when split, divided into a number of principalities whose rulers were sultans, even though some of them dared to assign themselves the more grandiose title of khan. A sultan was rarely a sovereign or independent ruler. The begs and clan chiefs were sometimes identical, but the beg was a local leader whose region varied in scope; it might be no larger than a village or a group of villages, or it might be larger than a clan.

C13
[622] Kin villages and families likewise had their individual patriarchal leaders. The lineage, however, is a different type of organization. It did not have a chief or center of patriarchal authority unless it was small enough for all its members to live in one large kin village; yet it could be so large as to be identical in size with a clan, in which case it would be ruled by a clan leader. The primary function of the lineage was to serve as a marriage unit, the genealogies once again providing the basis for the practices adopted. Kazakh boys and girls could not marry if they had a common male ancestor in the seventh generation; with kinship in the eighth degree or higher marriage was permitted. The genealogy traced back to the seventh ascending male ancestor is the smallest lineage of the Kazakh. The lineage is a unit of varying scope, depending on the function involved; the lineage for marital purposes comprised seven generations, the genealogy memorized by an individual many times that.¹

421
[614]
[692] Each clan had a distinctive manner of marking the ears of or branding its livestock to differentiate the stock from that of other clans. However, the clan was not the property-owning unit. The clan leader might step in and make a decision regarding a pasturage or head of cattle in dispute between two villages, for the judicial authority rested ultimately in his hands; his decisions might appear biased in his favor, but he could not permanently dispose of pasturage or stock which was not his own, even though it bore the brand or earmark of the clan he led. Similarly, until collectivization, the village authority rested in the hands of a village elder who served as a judge, but rarely could the judge dispose of property which was not his own.²

¹Crackov, 1889, p. 27; Altyasaria, 1870, p. 104.

²[for footnote see cat. 116, §. 41 - ANALYST.]

judge dispose of property which was not his own.⁴ The unit of property ownership was the family, and still is.

The clan was a military unit, and supplied companies of armed and mounted men to the armies of the khans and sultans. Each clan company fought under its own leader, and had its own distinctive rallying cry (in Turkic uran, from which "hurrah" is derived) which was usually a repetition of the names of illustrious leaders and warriors of the clan. These companies were used not only in wartime but in any time of trouble; they were called to help during feuds, for example, or in fending off thieves.

The clan supplied the khan with taxes in kind (usually livestock), in money, and in labor service. Taxes in money were not common, since money itself was a rarity on the steppe, and was to be found in the hands of traders and moneymen rather than among clansmen or clan leaders. The taxes paid by the clan to the khan were collected by the clan leader and paid for the group as a whole. Aside from livestock, the clan paid in labor service, reckoned in terms of transport duty and communications (messenger service). And the clan supplied able-bodied men in military companies under its own leaders, as required by the khan. The last century in which this system actually worked as a normal matter was the 18th century. By then the Kazakhs had been definitely divided into three hordes, and the khans ruled over each horde separately. By the 19th century, there were only two types of khans, those who came forward to unite their people against the Russians, such as Kenesary and Taimanov, and those who were maintained by the Russians, such as Khan Bukel of the Inner Horde, and his line.⁵

It is perhaps surprising to find a society in which the members are all theoretically related to each other by ties of blood, yet which is riven by class distinctions and by unequal distributions of ranks and privileges. Yet this is the case among many peoples of Central Asia, such as the Uzbeks and Kazakhs, and of Eastern Asia, such as the Mongols. The basis of social differentiation is the ranking of descent lines according to the order of birth of the founders. Once this differentiation is established, and the society is divided into aristocrats (by virtue of primogeniture) and commoners, more complex divisions follow. A leader or khan is then set up as the first among the aristocrats, and he forms a court of aides, ministers, viceroys, field commanders, priests, and so forth. The khan may ennoble a commoner as a reward for bravery in the field, or because he is literate and hence of exceptional utility to the state.

Theoretically, then, all Kazakhs are related to each other by ties of blood. This does not mean that they are all actually descendants of one founding ancestor, for such a figure lies so far in the past that it is necessarily mythical; the truth or falsity of the tradition can no longer be shown. In addition to the myth, however, the establishment of kinship is also achieved by another kind of fiction. Kinship may be based on adoption, whereby a son is regarded as though he were the

⁴Valikhoev, 1904, pp. 150 ff.; Radloff (104), 1893, pp. 513-514; Ilginov, 1878, pp. 234-237. Tvezin, 1864, pp. 3-6; Abdykalykov and Pankratova, 1943, pp. 148-141.

may even place the authority in the hands of an adult son, if he has one, or a brother. Recourse to such action may be taken only rarely, but it is nevertheless a recognized delimitation of paternal powers. The parental authority over the son serves as the model for all authority patterns in Kazakh society, such as those involving the village elder, the clan leader, the beg, and the khan.¹

In the past the parental authority was limited in another sense; the family was part of a village which camped and pastured its herds in common. The leaders of the village decided when and where to camp, when to change camp, when to break up the winter concentration of herds and families and move to the more dispersed spring and summer pastures.² A family head disobeyed these decisions at his risk. It was to his interest to follow them, since he gained many things thereby: fellowship, social position, protection from dangers by weight of numbers, assistance in time of need. The village in turn was subordinate to the clan authority if there was one. In case of raids, feuds, or other breaches of the peace, a village leader would appeal to the clan chief for aid. In a dispute between villages, a village elder would appeal to his clan chief for a judgment in his favor.

The village elder was the judge of his community, and decided all cases, usually with the support of the other senior men of the village. Appeals from their decisions were rare, defiance of their decisions even rarer. Behind the judgment of the village leader and the other elders lay the force of social solidarity, the weight of the entire village; defiance meant ejection and flight. Defiance of father by the son had similar consequences. The ultimate authority rested with the khan, if there was one, and if he cared to use his power, for he backed his authority with an army and the right of punishment by death or imprisonment, in addition to the force of his position.

The Kazakh household could include several wives if the position and wealth of the master allowed it. In one community studied, the Adai lineage on Mangyshlak peninsula, half the men had only one wife and half had two. In general, very few families contained more than two wives, although there is in theory no upper limit on the number of wives (exclusive of concubines) that a man can have. The ideal number of wives in princely families was considered to be five or nine—in contrast to the ideal number of wives for Moslems which the Koran gives as four. The family and marriage patterns of the Kazakhs are among the traits which give a pronouncedly non-Islamic coloring to their society.³

A youth was given his own tent and appurtenances when he came of age; traditionally he was soon to be married, and in fact a substantial number were married by the time they were 20 years old. Even as late as 1926, 222 out of every 1,000 males were married by that age, and in former years the rate was higher. The tent was not identical with the household unit. A young married couple with children did not

¹ Tarashev, 1897, pp. 3, 11.

² Radloff (104), 1893, p. 513; Rudenko et al, 1930, pp. 4-6.

³ Kertsz (73), 1910, p. 42.

-387-

619 they had names which harked back to the Chingiside era. Valikhanov draws an important implication from this: inasmuch as membership in any horde was based on ancestry, the union as a whole has a genealogical significance. The instances of Chingiside ancestry are not of the same order as the indigenous ones, therefore, ⁴⁹ for they are properly speaking fictitious.

419 The direct patrilineal descendants of the Kazakh nobility who brought the original confederation to life
428 are located by Kazakh tradition in the Little Horde. ⁵⁰
● 443
821

We know that the Little Horde was not an original founding member of the confederation of hordes, but was rather the junior member. So reads the Kazakh tradition reported by Valikhanov, and which must be accepted as a primary datum. Therefore the location of the original founder of the entire Kazakh confederation in the Little Horde depends on the application of another principle to regularize or legitimise the rank order of the Little Horde among the other hordes. The legitimizing principle according to which they sought to align the objective historical reality known to at least some Kazakhs is that of ultimogeniture. The Mongol law, according to Valikhanov, was still regarded as being in force through

⁴⁹ Idem.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 292.

-388-

619 transmission via Khan Tiavka (c. 1700). This law decreed
428 that the right of succession to the father's status and
643 to his residuary possessions, went to the youngest son
829 or to the youngest male family member; so Valikhanov
51 claimed. N.B.: we are in possession both of the Mon-
gol law code--the Great Yassa of Chingis Khan--and of
the code transmitted by Khan Tiavka. The provisions
of these codes relative to the inheritance of the father's
seniority in no way corresponds to the version given
here by Valikhanov. On the contrary, while the prin-
ciple of ultimogeniture applied to the residual cor-
poreal properties of the father and a special title,
not that of the father, the youngest son did not in-
herit his offices, rank, titles, social position, and
52 other incorporeal properties. But the important thing
619 is not the actual facts, namely the content of the codes
643 and decrees, but what the 19th century Kazakh believed
829 them to be; what he chose to make of them in the in-
terests of establishing a social order, a ranking of
the hordes, corresponding to other considerations. And
in order to legitimize the realization of those other
considerations, by assigning the priority to the founders
of the Little Horde, a double fiction was applied. First,

51 Idem.

52 Riasanovsky, Customary Laws, 7 ff; *ibid.*, Funda-
mental Principles, 83 ff.

-389-

619
• 643
829

there is the fiction that the Little Horde was the senior horde by virtue of the direct patrilineal descent of its nobility from the original Kazakh nobility. Second, there is the fiction of ultimogeniture, which, as a principle for the establishment of seniority, was imputed to law codes despite the fact that the principle in this form is nonexistent.

619
173

The clans which composed the hordes were common descent groups, whose structure was analogous to the corporation.⁵³ The clan's charter of incorporation is the genealogy, which may be real or fictive, that is, assigned to newcomers added to the clan, i.e., to one of its composite lineages. These genealogies were handed down by oral tradition and formed part of a larger set of oral traditions embodying the myths which gave expression to the unity of the group. It is not to be expected that these oral traditions would have the accuracy of written history. Quite the contrary, they might vary in every detail from each other as reported by two different Kazakhs, and this would still not alter in the least their validity as genealogies, for these genealogies

⁵³ Here I have in mind Fortes' exposition of the corporate character of the lineage, which I am in turn applying to the clan, for the same principles are at work: the corporation is a person; the corporation never dies (Henry Maine); it has rules of membership and admission to membership (Weber); and it has a center of authority (Weber). The last criterion is more applicable to the clan than the lineage. Fortes, Structure of Unilineal Descent Groups, 17-41.

-390-

619
173 are first of all clan myths which make no claim to objective historical reference.

619
173
443 As an instance of this,⁵⁴ portions of two Kazakh genealogies which purport to give the ancestry of a famous Kazakh Khan, Abul Hafr, who led a portion of the Little Horde over to the Russians in 1730, follow. The two genealogies are simply ten generations out out of much longer ones; the genealogy given in the left column was composed by a local Kazakh official named Dikembai-batyr⁵⁴ in the 1870's; that in the right column was taken down from the oral report of another Kazakh, Alikhan Buksikhan,⁵⁵ fifty years later, in the 1920's.

I Kerim	I Urus (1361-1376)
II Tuigash	II Kui-Ruchuk (1396)
III Kurenbai	III Barak
IV Djalyntus	IV Ijanibek
V Bab-kasym	V Usak
VI Er-bulantai	VI Bula-kai-kuyan
VII Sabaz-batyr	VII Ai-Chuwak
VIII Er-djomart	VIII Irysh
IX Alpyspek	IX Adja
X Abul-Hafr	X Abul-Hafr (1730)

⁵⁴Aristov, Opyt Vylasneniia, 394-395, note 2.

⁵⁵Chuloshnikov, appended genealogy.

²[i.e. the validity of contradictory genealogies;
cf. Cat. 619, p. 389-- Analyst]

-391-

619
173
643

The two genealogies were collected fifty years apart and in different parts of the steppe. They give the ancestry of the famous khan, but one who had lived a century and a half and two centuries respectively before the two genealogies were taken down. Nevertheless, it is interesting that these two tables differ entirely in detail with the possible exception of the names in the fourth ascending generation, Er-bulantay and Bula-kay-kuyan. The earlier genealogy is interesting for its slight Koranic cast: The ten generations listed by Aristov are but a segment of a genealogy which descends fifty-four generations from Adam to Abul-Hair. Adam's descendants in the eleventh and twelfth generations are Noah (Nuh) and Japhet (Yapys). Abraham and Isaac are also listed, but few other particulars correspond; for example, Ishmael is not named. ⁵⁶ The genealogy given by Chuloshnikov, on the contrary, mounts nineteen generations to Chingis Khan, and has no trace of the Koran or Islam. Most of the people mentioned are actual historical figures whose dates are ascertainable, and there is reason to believe that Chuloshnikov improved upon the original by reference to historical works.

The genealogy recorded by Aristov is an actual one, that of the head of the Botpay clan of the Great Horde during the last third of the 19th century. The prestige

⁵⁶Aristov, op. cit., 394.

-392-

649 of Abul-Hafr was so great that according to this gene-
173
643
alogy he was magnified as the founder and head of all
three hordes, and his line was reckoned through four-
teen generations to Botpay, the head of a clan in the
19th century. Abul-Hafr becomes a mythical figure in
this genealogical account, although he is a known his-
torical personage; we know, in fact, he was not the
founder of the Kazakh hordes. Similarly, he is known
to have flourished around the year 1730, and is not
separated by fourteen generations from the Kazakhs of
the 1860's, for this would imply an average of 9.3 years
per generation. There is another interesting feature
of the genealogy of Botpay: the descent line of that
clan head is traced through the generations in direct
senior patrilineal succession from Abul-Hafr, making
the head of the Botpay clan junior to no one, whether
in the Great Horde or among the Kazakhs generally.
Compare this with the version given by Valikhanov, wherein
seniority is assigned to the Little Horde, but on an en-
tirely different principle: in the account of Dikambay-
batyr in the 1870's, the validation of the Botpay claim
to seniority is based upon a genealogy of a line of eld-
est sons; on the contrary, Valikhanov's claim to vali-
dation is based upon a principle of ultimogeniture. Be-
cause of the exigencies of the inheritance and succession

⁵⁷ Ibid., 395-396.

-393-

619
173
643 pattern, both claims were possible in the 19th century. But because of the exigencies of history, specifically, the disunity and lack of rapport among the various segments of Kazakh society, the contradictory claims could never be settled, or even brought face to face.

619
181
173 This very lack of agreement, however, is indicative of a point whose significance cannot be stressed too greatly. These genealogies are not objective history; they serve a quite different end: among the Kazakhs, a learned man or a leader, or a combination of the two, expounded their genealogy to his people, which supplied them with the expression of their mutual relatedness and their existence as a group. If this genealogy is accepted by neighboring clans and related in turn to their own, then the members of all the clans involved have a point of departure in establishing inter-clan relations, involving rights of precedence, recognition of the degree of seniority and attendant prestige, and so forth. Moreover, the fact of acceptance of a clan's genealogy by related clans means the implied acceptance of an even greater genealogy which integrates and helps to form the greater unity among a number of clans. The genealogy is a charter which is expansive and contractive, depending on the demands made of it, the size of the groups, and the degree of consanguineal distance between the groups. And it is the charter whereby groups incorporate themselves into smaller or larger